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Comments
Federal Common Law and the Need for
Uniformity in the Regulation of Federal
Savings and Loan Associations and
Federal Credit Unions
Federal courts have authority to fashion federal common law in
a few narrow instances. Through an examination of relevant pre-
cedent in the area of federal common law, this Comment identifies
essential factors necessary for the fashioning of federal common
law where the rights and duties of the United States are involved.
It then applies the findings to the issue of whether state or federal
law should govern in actions against officers and directors of fed-
eral savings and loan associations and federal credit unions for
breach of fiduciary duties or breach of bylaws. This Comment
also finds that some federal courts circumvent the limitations im-
posed on their authority to imply private rights of action by creat-
ing such rights under federal common law.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Until the landmark decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,1 the
federal courts enjoyed broad power to fashion common law. Erie
curtailed this power significantly but did not eliminate it altogether.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
As long as the issue raised a federal question that could not be an-
swered by resorting to federal statutes alone, the court was free to
devise a federal answer.2 In the years that followed, the Supreme
Court continued to narrow the opportunity of the federal courts to
fashion common law by limiting the conditions under which a court
is competent to develop law and by limiting the types of rules that
can be fashioned.3 The nature and scope of these limitations have,
unfortunately, remained unclear. As a result, federal courts at times
formulate rules of decision where they lack the power to do so.
This Comment examines the evolution of federal common law and
recent developments in the area of implied private rights of action
under federal statutes. It applies the findings to a current issue:
whether federal common law or state law should apply in private
causes of action against officers and directors of federal savings and
loan associations and federal credit unions for breach of fiduciary
duties or breach of bylaws. The private causes of action discussed
herein are based in part on alleged violations of federal statutes or
the regulations4 promulgated under them which govern the organiza-
tion, operation, and examination of federal savings and loan associa-
tions and federal credit unions.' In the main, these actions are
2. E.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939);
D'Oejnch, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
3. See discussion infra part IV.B.
4. The regulations that are alleged to have been violated in these cases were
promulgated by either the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board) or by the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the federal agencies created to give effect to the
federal statutes involved, namely the Federal Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA),
12 U.S.C. §1461 (1976) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991))
and the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. §1751 (1976) (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
5. In 1989, Congress, in a sweeping effort to resolve the financial crises of federal
thrifts, enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). In so doing, Congress abolished the Board, and the Federal
Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which was supervised by the Board,
and allocated the regulatory functions of these agencies to three separate bodies: the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and the Federal Home Financing Board (Finance Board). The OTS assumed the Board's
chartering and regulatory powers, see infra note 114, the FDIC assumed its deposit in-
surance functions, and the Finance Board assumed its supervisory functions, By means of
this restructuring of responsibilities, Congress expected to reduce the conflicts of interest
that existed under the previous regulatory scheme. The FIRREA also provided for the
creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to manage savings and loan associa-
tions for which a conservator or receiver had been appointed. Paul T. Clark et. al., Regu-
lation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1023-27 (1990).
The FIRREA amended and repealed several provisions of the HOLA under which the
regulations allegedly violated were promulgated; nevertheless, the FIRREA "provides
that all orders, resolutions, determinations, and regulations which were issued, made,
prescribed, or allowed to become effective by the Bank Board or the FSLIC, and which
were in effect on August 9, 1989 [the date the FIRREA was enacted] shall continue in
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brought to federal district courts under federal question jurisdiction.6
Although federal credit unions and federal savings and loan
associations are chartered under different federal statutes7 and are
thus subject to different regulations, federal courts faced with
questions involving these institutions agree that they "are similar in
important respects."' Not only are federal credit unions and federal
savings and loan associations regulated by federal agencies with
comparable powers and obligations, but the legislative histories of
the statutes authorizing their creation reveal the same congressional
concern for the uniform regulation of their internal administration
and operation. Most important for the purposes of this Comment,
the federal credit union and savings and loan association cases all
raise the same legal issue: whether it is appropriate for federal courts
to fashion a federal common law cause of action when the statute's
legislative history reveals that Congress was explicit in its concern
for uniform regulation but the text of the statute and its history are
silent as to the availability of a private right of action. This common
issue, more than anything else, explains why courts adjudicating fed-
eral credit union disputes often use federal savings and loan associa-
tion cases as supporting precedent and vice versa.
Part II of this Comment examines the rationale of courts that up-
hold the fashioning of federal common law in this area and of those
that oppose it in favor of applying state law. In general, courts that
hold in favor of formulating a federal common law cause of action
justify their decisions by pointing to the statute's legislative history
effect according with their terms and shall remain enforceable by or against the Director
[of the OTS], the FDIC, the Finance Board, or the RTC, as the case may be, until
modified, terminated, set aside, or superseded in accordance with the applicable law." Id.
at 1027 (citing FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(h), 103 Stat. at 357). Thus, the
FIRREA instituted primarily organizational changes while leaving the substantive law,
that is, the HOLA, the FCUA, and the regulations promulgated under them, largely
intact. The FIRREA, however, expanded the power of the Board's successor, the OTS, in
certain respects and established a federal standard of gross negligence, 12 U.S.C. §
1821(k) (Supp. III 1991), that applies only in actions brought by the FDIC against
officers and directors of federal thrift institutions. See infra note 114. For an assessment
of how these developments may affect private suits brought by federal savings and loan
associations against their former directors, see infra part IV.C.
6. The federal courts have jurisdiction in these cases pursuant to article III of the
United States Constitution, which grants the courts jurisdiction over all cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
7. See supra notes 4-5.
8. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 1982). See also National Alliance
of Postal & Fed. Employees v. Nickerson, 424 F. Supp. 323, 325 (D.D.C. 1976) (super-
visory powers of the Board analogous to those of the NCUA).
and the need for uniformity in the regulation of federal financial in-
stitutions. Courts that reject the use of federal common law insist
that the claims raised are traditionally relegated to state law and
that the federal courts lack authority to fashion a federal common
law cause of action in cases where the statutory scheme is compre-
hensive enough to evidence congressional intent to bar the creation
of additional judicial remedies.
Part III analyzes recent Supreme Court precedents on implied pri-
vate rights of action, particularly the restrictions imposed by Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington.9 The analysis reveals that in looking for
manifestations of congressional intent to create a right of action that
is not explicit in the statute, the Court primarily examined the stat-
ute's remedial scheme. Because a comprehensive scheme supports
the presumption that Congress provided exactly the remedies it
deemed appropriate, the Court was unwilling to imply additional
rights of action even when doing so would promote the objectives of
the legislation. Part III also examines the enforcement provisions of
the Federal Home Owner's Act (HOLA), the Federal Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), and the Fed-
eral Credit Union Act (FCUA). It finds that they are comparable to
the enforcement scheme that the Court found in Touche Ross to
preclude the fashioning of new remedies. Part III concludes that
courts that create new rights of action under federal common law
are circumventing the restrictions placed on their authority to imply
rights of action.
Part IV reviews the development of federal common law since the
time of Erie. It focuses on one of the two instances in which federal
courts have the power to fashion federal common law, namely when
uniquely federal interests are involved. The analysis indicates that
not all interests that can be characterized as uniquely federal qual-
ify. Rather, when the rights and duties of the United States are in-
volved, the courts have the authority to fashion law when the
development of national, uniform law is required to protect the oper-
ation of nationwide federal programs or the national treasury. The
courts are not justified in fashioning federal common law even when
a federal statute may be identified as the source of an asserted right
unless the rights and duties of the United States are also affected in
the aforementioned respects. Moreover, no authority supports the
creation of new rights or new liabilities under federal common law.
Applying these findings to the federal savings and loan association
and federal credit union cases previously discussed, Part IV con-
cludes that state law should apply.
Lastly, Part V summarizes the prerequisites for fashioning federal
9. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
[VOL. 29: 743. 1992] Federal Common Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
common law. It also discusses why federal courts resort to creating
federal common law despite the absence of the prerequisites in the
given case. This Part encourages the Supreme Court to reconsider its
current position and allow the federal courts to fashion private rights
of action when such rights are required to further the objectives of
congressional acts. It also proposes that when the rights and duties
of the United States are involved, federal courts should not have the
power to fashion law in favor of the United States without statutory
guidance.
II. THE CASES AND THE CONFLICTS
A. Introduction
This Part presents a number of federal credit union and federal
savings and loan association cases that address the creation of causes
of action under federal common law. As will be shown, the majority
of courts agree that no express or implied right of action exists under
the pertinent federal statutes. The courts reach this decision by ex-
amining the language and legislative histories of the statutes to de-
termine whether there is support for either an express or implied
right of action. After discerning that no express or implied right of
action can be found under the statutes,"0 the courts consider whether
one can be fashioned under federal common law. But not all courts
that consider this question reach the same conclusion.
B. Federal Credit Union Cases in Favor of Fashioning
Federal Common Law
In Barany v. Buller," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that federal law applied in an action brought
by elected members of a federal credit union's credit committee who
were unlawfully removed from office by the credit union's board of
directors." Plaintiffs alleged that the credit union's board had acted
without authority, contrary to the removal provisions of the FCUA,
10. Only one court found an implied right of action under the HOLA, City Fed.
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1975). This case, however,
was adjudicated before the strict judicial standard for implications of private rights of
action under federal statutes was handed down by the United States Supreme Court. See
discussion infra part III.B.
11. 670 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 735.
which empower only the supervisory committee to take such action."3
In adjudicating this issue, the Barany court first considered plain-
tiff's assertion that the FCUA provided an implied right of action.
Because there was no indication of legislative intent to create a pri-
vate right of action, none could be implied.1 4 But resolution of the
issue did not end there. The court went on to discuss why a remedy
of the kind sought by plaintiffs was available under federal common
law. Although Congress did not intend to provide a private cause of
action for the enforcement of the Act's provisions, neither did it in-
tend to deny all federal relief in the matter. 5 Although there is "'no
federal general common law,' "16 the Supreme Court had authorized
the fashioning of "specific" federal common law when "'uniquely
federal interests'" are involved.11 The court then turned to the Act's
legislative history, which revealed the presence of a uniquely federal
interest.
By the time the first federal credit union was established in 1934,
thirty-eight states had already enacted credit union laws. The credit
unions fared well during the economic depression of the 1930s; nev-
ertheless, Congress saw a need for a federal credit union statute. The
credit union laws of the various states were not only "inadequate"
but, just as important, "the state banking department lacked interest
in credit unions.""' Thus, to protect the public's buying power from
usurious money-lending practices and to deal with the consumer
credit problems, a "national problem" with no state boundaries,
13. Id. at 728. The removal provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1761d (1976), provided: "The
supervisory committee ... may by unanimous vote suspend ... any member of the credit
committee ... until the next members' meeting, which shall be held not less than seven
nor more than fourteen days after any such suspension, at which meeting any such sus-
pension shall be acted upon by the members .... " Barany, 670 F.2d at 728 n.5.
14. Barany, 670 F.2d at 729-31. In a footnote the Barany court also noted that in
Helskala v. Johnson Space Center Fed. Credit Union, 474 F. Supp. 448, 454 (S.D. Tex.
1979), the court there also held that the FCUA did not support a private right of action
in favor of a credit union employee who was fired because she criticized the credit
union's management. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731 n.8.
15. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731. In support of its decision to provide a remedy, the
Barany court cited Harrington v. Philadelphia City Employees Fed. Credit Union, 243
Pa. Super. 33, 364 A.2d 435 (1976), which also held that a judicial remedy was avail-
able. Barany, 670 F.2d at 732. In justifying its decision to consider federal common law
as a source for the remedy, the court cited Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981), and Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materi-
als, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), for the proposition that failure to find an implied cause of
action under the Act did not preclude the consideration of federal common law. Barany,
670 F.2d at 735-36. See discussion infra part III.D. for an analysis of the Barany court's
decision.
16. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731 (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938)).
17. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426
(1964)).
18. Id. at 733.
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Congress enacted the FCUA.19 In addition to fostering the develop-
ment of credit unions in states without credit union statutes, the
FCUA also established federal jurisdiction for federal credit unions20
and provided for their uniform administration, an issue of "para-
mount" importance to Congress. 2 Just as important, the FCUA
called for federal credit unions to be governed by a democratically
elected board of directors and credit committees, thereby rdistin-
guishing them from their state-chartered counterparts.2
The Barany court also found support in subsequent legislative de-
velopments, which increasingly federalized the field by calling on the
National Credit Union Association (NCUA) to insure federal credit
unions and by giving the agency powers similar to those of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (Board). 23 The court also relied on the
decisions of several other circuit and appellate courts faced with sim-
ilar issues in the related area of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. These courts readily formulated federal remedies not found in
the relevant statutes or regulations on the grounds that the need for
uniformity in the administration of federal institutions required the
application of federal law.24
The last issue examined by the Barany court was the extent to
which the FCUA's remedial provisions preempted the application of
federal common law. In so doing, the court recognized the rule es-
tablished by the Supreme Court:25 because fashioning new remedies
would upset the statute's "integrated system of remedies," federal
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 731.
22. Id. at 734 ("The salient feature of credit unions is their democratic control and
management . . . .") (citation omitted).
23. id.
24. The Barany court cited, among other cases, Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. and
Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967). In Murphy, potential directors of a federal
savings and loan association brought suit in federal court seeking declaratory judgment
that would allow them to inspect the list of eligible voters for directors in the association.
Plaintiffs succeeded. With respect to the issue of whether state or federal law applied,
Judge Friendly remarked: "'Congress could hardly have intended that the rights of
members of federal savings and loan associations to fair election should vary with quirks
of law .... .' Barany, 670 F.2d at 735 (quoting Murphy, 388 F.2d at 611-12). The
Barany court also cited Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 405 F.
Supp. 819, 826-27 (N.D. Ill. 1975), where the court held that the plenary powers of the
Board precluded application of state law in matters involving the internal operation of
these institutions. Barany, 670 F.2d at 735.
25. The rule was discussed in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries. See infra
text accompanying notes 144-54.
courts should refrain from fashioning additional remedies not in-
tended by Congress.2" The Barany court, however, pointed out that
because the remedial scheme set forth by the FCUA did not provide
the requested relief, it was not comprehensive enough to evidence a
congressional intent to bar the fashioning of additional judicial reme-
dies. Thus, the Barany court concluded that a federal common law
remedy in the form of a quo warranto proceeding was available to
plaintiffs under the federal common law of federal credit unions.2 7
In a more recent decision, Rosenberg v. AT&T Employees Fed-
eral Credit Union,28 a federal court again faced the question of
whether federal relief is available in a case involving the alleged
breach of federal credit union bylaws by its board of directors. Plain-
tiff contended that the board of directors had failed to adhere to the
bylaw provisions for election and had in bad faith thwarted his at-
tempt to obtain a position on the board by cancelling the elections. 20
The Rosenberg court agreed with Barany's finding that no express or
implied cause of action for violations of the election provisions was
available under the FCUA.30 It also agreed with Barany that "the
history of the Act reveals that the uniform administration of federal
credit unions, which can be achieved only by application of federal
law, was of paramount importance to Congress when it enacted the
FCUA." 31
Congress's desire for uniformity in the administration of federal
credit unions was further evinced by the fact that it had authorized
the NCUA to promulgate the standard bylaws. The court also recog-
nized that this uniformity "would likely be frustrated if state laws
were to provide the remedy for a breach of bylaws. '' 32 Unlike the
Barany court, the Rosenberg court went on to examine the laws of
the state in which it sat (New Jersey) to determine the adequacy of
the available state law remedy for breach of bylaws. In the process,
the court noted that the state's credit union laws had supplanted
state common law dealing with credit unions. 3 Thus, it was not
clear whether a state remedy was available at all. Moreover, if plain-
tiff had a remedy, he would be dependent on the State Commissioner
of Banking to sue on his behalf. 34 The court concluded that "this
26. Barany, 670 F.2d at 736 (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)).
27. Id. at 735.
28. 726 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1989).
29. Id. at 575. Plaintiff also alleged that the election provisions had been violated
before the election of each of the existing board members. Id.
30. Id. at 577.
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kind of dependency on the peculiarities of the laws of the various
states is inconsistent with Congress' interest in uniformity when it
created the Federal Credit Union Act."3
The court also recognized that plaintiff had no administrative
remedy to exhaust that could preclude his seeking judicial relief for
his grievance. The NCUA had informed plaintiff that it does not
become involved in disputes over the democratic governance of fed-
eral credit unions.36 Plaintiff had either a judicial remedy or none at
all. Members of federal credit unions, the court declared, must look
to the federal courts to ensure the democratic governance of federal
credit unions. However, "[i]f enforcement of those requirements de-
pended upon the vagaries of applying the law of fifty different states,
the democratic control intended by Congress might be thwarted.13 7
The Rosenberg court thus concluded that a federal common law
cause of action for breach of bylaws was in order.38
C. Federal Credit Union Cases Against Fashioning
Federal Common Law
Not all courts that have confronted this issue have decided to for-
mulate a federal common law cause of action to redress possible vio-
lations of the FCUA or the bylaws promulgated under it. Recently,
in Ridenour v. Andrews Federal Credit Union, 9 the court denied
plaintiff a common law cause of action in a case involving virtually
the same provisions of the federal code that were alleged to have
been violated in Barany.4 ° In Ridenour, a member of the board of
directors and three other supervisory employees alleged that they
were unlawfully removed from their positions by the credit union's
board of directors. 1
Although the Ridenour court recognized that democratic govern-
ance distinguished federal credit unions from other lending institu-
tions, the court, after a review of the statutory provisions, concluded
that Congress did not intend to create the asserted cause of action.42
35. Id.
36. Id. at 579.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 897 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1990).
40. As in Barany, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, plaintiffs' claims for
damages in Ridenour were based on 12 U.S.C. § 1761, which addresses the powers and
duties of the credit union's board of directors. Ridenour, 897 F.2d at 718-19.
41. Ridenour, 897 F.2d at 716-17.
42. Id. at 722.
The court noted that Congress had provided a comprehensive reme-
dial structure for officers who had been removed by the NCUA and
that this created a "strong negative inference that Congress did not
deem the removal of a director by his fellow members on a local
credit union's board sufficiently important to warrant creating a fed-
eral cause of action. '4 3 Because Congress had "so recently spoken to
the question of credit union employee job protection" and created a
new cause of action under limited conditions,44 the court was "not
prepared to find" an implied cause of action for discharge or removal
based on other circumstances.45
The court then went on to examine the possibility of providing a
private cause of action under federal common law and concluded
that perhaps the most compelling factor for not formulating a fed-
eral common law cause of action is "the NCUA's choice not to give
the bylaws that govern removal of board members the authority of
agency regulation. '46 Because "'[flederal courts lack authority to
impose more stringent [standards] under federal common law than
those imposed by the agency charged by Congress with administer-
ing the comprehensive scheme,'" the Ridenour court held that
applying federal common law to the case at bar would be
inappropriate.47
The Ridenour court is not the only court to hold against fashion-
ing a federal common law cause of action. In Montford v. Robins
Federal Credit Union,48 the court found that the NCUA was the
proper body to resolve complaints about possible violations of the
regulations controlling the internal operation of federal credit un-
ions.40 In Montford, plaintiff was appointed to the position of loan
officer by the credit union's credit committee. She was subsequently
discharged from the position by the board of directors for failing to
adhere to the credit union's loan policies. Plaintiff, however, con-
tended that she had been terminated because of her efforts to obtain
union representation for the credit union's employees. 50
43. Id. at 721.
44. Congress designed the new cause of action to protect federal credit union em-
ployees who report violations of law to the NCUA or to the Attorney General. The
amendment to the FCUA creating the cause of action was enacted as part of the FIR-
REA, see supra note 5, and is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1790b (Supp. I 1991).
45. Ridenour, 897 F.2d at 721.
46. Id. at 722.
47. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1981)).
48. 691 F. Supp. 347 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
49. Id. at 355.
50. Id. at 348-50. Plaintiff had previously filed an unfair labor practice claim with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). But, after several unsuccessful attempts to
obtain a reinstatement and damages through the NLRB and its administrative proceed-
ings, plaintiff finally instigated the suit in United States district court, alleging violations
of the FCUA and other claims. Id.
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The Montford court, like the majority of courts that had ruled on
this question, found that no implied private right of action existed
under the FCUA.5 In considering the possibility of a federal com-
mon law cause of action, the court recognized the similarities be-
tween the facts of the case at bar and Barany's. But while the
Montford court acknowledged the Barany court's findings that a fed-
eral common law quo warranto proceeding was available to deter-
mine a person's right to an office, it stopped short of ruling that such
a remedy was available to plaintiff Montford. Instead the court de-
clared that a "quo warranto proceeding is available only to prevent
the continued exercise of unlawful authority and not to correct what
has been done under that authority. 52 Since neither the individual
defendants nor the credit union continued to exercise the alleged un-
lawful authority, 53 the court refused to invoke the common law rem-
edy of a quo warranto proceeding. 4
Moreover, because plaintiff Montford had failed to state a claim
under the FCUA, the court declined to rule on whether defendants
had exceeded their authority when they fired her. Such decisions, the
court declared, are more properly made by the NCUA 5 5 The
51. Id. at 351. In addition to finding that a cause of action could not be implied
under the FCUA, the Montford court held that none could be created under federal
common law. It then dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Id. Contra Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union, 897 F.2d
715, 719 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that when "jurisdiction fails because no such federal
claim exists, the proper disposition is to dismiss on the merits for failure to state a claim
rather than for want of subject matter jurisdiction").
52. Montford, 691 F. Supp. at 354. Indeed, in reaching this decision, the
Montford court cited the second Barany appeal, Barany v. Buller (Barany II), 707 F.2d
285 (7th Cir. 1983). Montford, 691 F. Supp. at 353 n.5 In Barany II, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding on the issue of damages and
instructed it to dismiss plaintiffs' request for injunctive and declaratory relief (to be rein-
stated to their former credit union posts) as moot because the plaintiffs' terms of office
had long since expired and plaintiffs had failed to stand for reelection to preserve the
dispute. Barany I, 707 F.2d at 286-87. But the court also indicated that even if plaintiffs
had run for reelection it would have nevertheless dismissed the claims because the al-
leged wrongdoers were no longer in office and "the possibility that plaintiffs, even if re-
elected, would again be faced with a policy disagreement, or would be discharged by the
Board of Directors over such disagreement, is a wholly speculative one." Id. at 287.
53. Since the filing of the present complaint, plaintiff had been dismissed from her
position by both the credit committee that existed at the time of her termination and the
present credit committee, the very body that had legal authority under the bylaws to take
such action. Montford, 691 F. Supp. at 350 n.l. Thus, the alleged unlawful exercise of
authority had ceased to exist. Montford, 691 F. Supp. at 354.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 354 n.6.
FCUA's "extensive remedial scheme," 6 the court stated, "supports
the conclusion that Congress intended to give the National Credit
Union Administration Board, not federal courts, the authority and
power to resolve disputes such as the one presently before this
court. '57 In addition, not only is the NCUA "in a better position to
interpret the meaning of its own bylaws," but "uniformity and con-
sistency throughout the national credit union system" would also be
promoted by requiring credit union employees to submit their com-
plaints directly to the NCUA Board.58 The court then advised plain-
tiff to exhaust the administrative remedies available to her. If she
remained dissatisfied, she could then seek redress under the FCUA
in an appropriate circuit court of appeals."
The existence of the NCUA and its plenary powers to resolve dis-
putes involving a federal credit union provides a court that is reluc-
tant to fashion law with an easy means of disposing of the case
before it. Although federal savings and loan associations are regu-
lated by a comparable administrative agency,60 courts adjudicating
disputes in this area have relied on other grounds, such as the tradi-
tional state nature of the claim raised, in refusing to fashion law.
But as the following section shows, the same rationale that supports
the fashioning of federal common law in the federal credit union
area, specifically the need for uniform regulation, figures promi-
nently in decisions to fashion federal common law in the area of sav-
ings and loan associations.
D. Federal Savings and Loan Association Cases in Favor of
Fashioning Federal Common Law
In Eureka Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell,61 plaintiffs
brought an action against former officers and directors for breach of
fiduciary duties, violations of federal regulation, and other claims.62
Defendants contended that no implied right of action could be found
under the HOLA, and the court agreed.6 a But rather than dismiss
56. Id. at 355. The court described the "elaborate" administrative system that en-
abled the NCUA to investigate and remedy violations of laws and regulations and noted
that Congress had given the NCUA the authority to terminate any officer, director, and
committee member upon a showing of wrongdoing in an appropriate hearing. Id. at
354-55. See infra note 114.
57. Id. at 355.
58. Id.
59. Id. From this it appears that the Montford court was completely unaware that
the NCUA has repeatedly been unwilling to become involved in disputes over the demo-
cratic governance of the credit unions it oversees. See supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
60. See supra note 8 and infra note 114.
61. 672 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
62. Id. at 437.
63. Id. at 439. Kidwell was brought in 1987, two years before the FIRREA, see
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the case, the Kidwell court proceeded to examine the question of
whether defendants were liable for breach of fiduciary duties under
federal common law.
Like the court in Barany, the Kidwell court held that plaintiff's
"complaint raises unique federal interests in the uniform regulation
of the federally chartered savings and loan associations that can only
properly be protected by the application of a federal rule of deci-
sion."64 The court found support for its position by turning to the
language and history of the HOLA. Congress was motivated to en-
act the statute and its regulatory system by'a crisis in the nation's
private home financing system that had "developed at least in part
as a result of the inconsistent and ill-advised practices of the various
states."65 Congress hoped that the rules promulgated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board would result in uniform and sound savings
and loans association practices. Thus, the statute's history supported
the proposition that there is a significant federal interest in uniform
regulation of federal financial institutions. 66
The court found additional support for its decision to establish a
supra note 5, was enacted. The HOLA, see supra note 5, did not provide a private cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duties, nor did it establish a standard for adjudication of
breach of fiduciary causes of actions whether these actions were brought by private par-
ties or a federal agency. Eureka Savings and Loan Association, nevertheless, sought the
formulation of both a private right of action and, conceivably, a favorable federal stan-
dard through federal common law..But while the court held in favor of providing a fed-
eral common law cause of action, nowhere did it discuss the standard that would be
applicable in such an action.
Today, under the FIRREA, both of these issues remain relevant. See AmeriFirst Bank
v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1991). Like the HOLA, the FIRREA does not
provide a private cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties. However, unlike the
HOLA, which made no mention of a federal standard, the FIRREA established the high
standard of gross negligence for actions instigated by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)
(Supp. III 1991). See infra note 114. Because this standard does not apply to private
parties, but only to the federal government, the question of what is or should be the
federal common law standard for private parties pursuing a breach of fiduciary duties
cause of action thus remains. The FIRREA gross negligence standard may, nevertheless,
affect the willingness of the court to establish a private cause of action under federal
common law. The FIRREA standard is also likely to influence the development of the
federal common law standard were one to be established in the future. See discussion
infra part IV.C. of the likelihood that a federal common law private cause of action will
continue to be available notwithstanding the FIRREA.
64. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. at 439.
65. Id. An examination of current state credit union law would determine whether
the practices of the various states continue to be inconsistent or ill-advised. Such a find-
ing may lend support to the view that there is a current need for uniformity and thus to
the decisions in Barany, Rosenberg, Kidwell, and others, favoring the application of fed-
eral common law. Unfortunately, such a examination is beyond the scope of this paper.
66. Id.
federal common law cause of action in the "'plenary authority'"
given to the Board to create rules and regulations governing the in-
ternal administration of federal savings and loan associations. 7 The
court emphasized the significant extent to which the Board's regula-
tions occupied the field and found that the federal regulatory scheme
was sufficiently "comprehensive" and "detailed" such that the
Board's regulations had "largely, if not in fact completely, pre-
empted the state regulation of federal savings and loan associa-
tions."68 In sum, because only the Board may regulate the internal
affairs of federal savings and loans associations, state law was pre-
cluded. Moreover, because the fiduciary duties of the associations'
officers and directors "'are matters relating to the internal affairs of
these associations, only federal law may be applied to questions in-
volving them.' "69
Kidwell is not the only case to hold in favor of creating a federal
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties. In First Hawaiian
Bank v. Alexander," plaintiff's complaint charged former officers
and directors with multiple counts, including state and federal com-
mon law breach of fiduciary duties. 71 As did the district court in
Kidwell, the First Hawaiian Bank court dismissed the claims for al-
leged violations of federal regulations, 72 finding that neither an ex-
press or implied cause of action could be found under the HOLA. 73
However, the court found that the issue of whether a private cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duties was available under federal
common law was "separate and distinct. '7 * Although the court rec-
ognized that the issue "becomes more clouded ' ' 75 when considering
67. Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
161 (1982)).
68. Id. In so doing, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in De La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 161-63, which favored federal preemption.
69. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp at 440 (quoting Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
70. 558 F. Supp 1128 (D. Haw. 1983).
71. Id. at 1130.
72. Id. at 1131. The court also dismissed the cause of action for violation of a
similar state regulatory statute. Id.
73. Id. In reaching this decision, the court examined the HOLA for congressional
intent to create a private right of action, but did not end its inquiry there. Following the
Supreme Court's lead in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982), the court also examined "the contemporary legal context in which the legis-
lation was amended" to discern whether that context supported an implied right of ac-
tion. First Hawaiian Bank, 558 F. Supp. at 1131. The court found that unlike Curran,
Congress had not affirmatively considered the existence of a private right of action when
amending the HOLA in 1966, partly because there was no case law establishing a pri-
vate cause of action at that time. Thus Congress, in reviewing and expanding the Board's
enforcement powers, had authorized only the extreme remedy of receivership. For these
reasons, the court held that no implied right of action was available under the federal
statute.
74. Id. at 1132.
75. Id. at 1131.
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the application of federal common law, it decided to follow the path
taken by Barany, which held that "federal common law remedies are
not precluded where the statute's remedies do not afford the ag-
grieved parties at least a reasonable alternative to the relief
sought. 17 6 Thus the court in First Hawaiian Bank, as did the court
in Barany, opted to fill the interstices of the federal statute by fash-
ioning a federal common law cause of action, reasoning that
uniquely federal interests in the uniform administration of federally
regulated financial institutions required the application of federal
common law.7 7 Application of a "single federal standard" was con-
sistent with the underlying purpose of the federal statute.78
E. Federal Savings and Loan Association Cases Against
Fashioning Federal Common Law
As noted earlier, courts that favor the application of federal com-
mon law base their decisions on the need for uniformity in the regu-
lation of the internal affairs of federal financial institutions. One
would therefore expect courts opposed to applying federal common
law to decline to recognize this need for uniformity. But the contro-
versy is not so clear cut. Courts that have refused to fashion a fed-
eral common law cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties have
done so even while recognizing that the regulation of federally
chartered or insured financial institutions is a uniquely federal
interest.
In a recent case, AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 7 the court acknowl-
edged that so as "to ensure the safety, soundness and financial integ-
rity of the internal management and administration of savings and
loan institutions, Congress has enacted a wide range of regulations
governing lending practices, the obligations of managers, and the ac-
counting standards and practices that must be followed in the thrift
setting."8 The court, however, proceeded to find that traditional
state law claims, such as breach of fiduciary duties, failed to have "a
sufficient nexus to the federal government to warrant the creation of
a federal common law cause of action" despite the fact that the
claim for breach of fiduciary duties was based in part on violations
76. Id. at 1132 (citing Barany, 670 F.2d at 736).
77. Id. (citing Barany, 670 F.2d at 734).
78. Id. (citing Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp.
819 (N.D. I11. 1975)).
79. 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
80. Id. at 1373.
of the comprehensive system of federal regulations.81
When considering the issue of fashioning federal common law, the
court pointed out that the litigation was between private parties and
"'does not touch the rights and duties of the United States.' "82 Per-
mitting plaintiffs to sue their former officers and directors under
state law, moreover, would not "interfere with the successful func-
tioning of the comprehensive federal scheme governing the savings
and loan industry or with the protection of the federal insurance
fund even though the law of fiduciary duties may vary somewhat
from state to state."8 3 The court did, however, recognize that the
violation of federal regulations would constitute "some evidence that
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the substantive
principles of state law."84 But given the minimal conflict between the
federal interest and state law, the court saw no reason to fashion
federal common law.85
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS ON IMPLIED RIGHTS OF
ACTION UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
A. Introduction
As previously noted, the majority of courts agree that no express
or implied right of action can be found under either the FCUA or
the HOLA. In light of this agreement, it might seem unnecessary to
review the case law on implied rights of action. Yet the question of
whether a right of action can be implied from a federal statute bears
greatly upon the broader issue of the appropriateness of fashioning
federal common law. Indeed the Supreme Court's shift in approach
to implied liability toward a narrower focus on congressional intent
has limited the opportunities for courts to judicially imply causes of
action. As will be shown, this change in approach may have much to
do with the lower courts' willingness to consider federal common law
as an alternative means of providing plaintiffs with federal relief,
particularly in those cases where no state remedy seems to be
available.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988)
(quoting Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956))).
83. Id. at 1374.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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B. The Cort v. Ash Test and Its Abandonment in Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash"8 first outlined the
four-factor test for determining whether a private right of action is
implicit in federal statutes that do not expressly provide one:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?817
Although the court did not give any indication of the relative signifi-
cance of the factors, it did indicate that the first factor would con-
trol, at least in cases where a literal reading of the statute clearly
indicated that Congress had created rights in favor of plaintiff." The
Court also seemed to place equal weight on the third factor, citing
J.L Case Co. v. Borak8 9 for the proposition that "'it is the duty of
the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose.' "190
But while Borak was not the first case in which the Court created
a new right of action to effectuate the purposes of a statute,9' it rep-
resents one of the last instances in which the Court applied the more
discretionary and longstanding 92 judicial approach toward implied
rights of action. This is because Borak and Cort soon gave way to a
much narrower judicial approach, one that applied strict rules of
86. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
87. Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
88. The Court stated: "True, in situations in which it is clear that federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create
a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of action
would be controlling." Id. at 82.
89. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
90. Cort, 422 U.S. at 84 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 433).
91. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375
n.54 (1982), Justice Stevens traced the broader approach exemplified in Borak back to
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). He also traced the "'indisputable rule
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,'" back to Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
92. Thus, Professor Ashford writes: "[T]he antecedent analysis has been an impor-
tant factor in the Supreme Court's determination of implied liability under federal stat-
utes in a long line of cases spanning over half a century." Robert H. A. Ashford, Implied
Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U.L.
REV. 227, 233 (1984).
statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to
create the requested right of action.
The Court introduced this new approach in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,93 wherein it examined the question of whether customers
of a brokerage firm had an implied cause of action for damages
against the brokerage firm's accounting company. Plaintiffs alleged
that the accounting company, Touche Ross, had improperly audited
and certified false financial reports for submission to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in violation of section 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA).94 The accounting firm had
thus prevented the brokerage firm's true financial condition from be-
coming known in time for customers to take action to forestall liqui-
dation or lessen their financial damage. 95
The Supreme Court's answer to plaintiff's request that it recognize
an implied cause of action was unequivocally negative. Quoting Can-
non v. University of Chicago,96 the Court declared: "'The fact that a
federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that
person.' ,,97 The analysis involves the interpretation of a statute and
consequently "must begin with the language of the statute itself."9' 8
The Court concluded that while the intent of the statute is to give
the SEC sufficient warning to take action to protect investors before
the brokerage firm's collapse, "[section] 17(a) does not by any
streich of its language purport to confer private damages rights or,
indeed, any remedy in the event the regulatory authorities are unsuc-
cessful in achieving their objectives and the broker becomes insolvent
93. 442 U.S. 560 (1979)
94. The relevant version was 5 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970). Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at
562 n.2.
95. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 565-66. The district court held that §17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), was "a bookkeeping provision. By its terms, it ... did not
'create rights in anybody.'" Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 566 n.8 (quoting Redington v.
Touche Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483, 489, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). In contrast, § 18(a)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), did create an express right of action in favor
of persons who had bought or sold stock which had been affected by the report while
relying on the report's validity. Because Congress had provided an express right of ac-
tion, the district court concluded that Congress intended that § 18(a) be the exclusive
remedy for § 17(a) violations. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 567 n.8. The court of appeals,
however, reversed. Because, in its view "it was plain that broker's customers were the
'favored wards' of § 17(a), it could not agree that 'Congress simultaneously sought to
protect a class and deprived the class [by virtue of § 18's limiting language] of the means
of protection.'" Id. at 567 n.9 (quoting Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617,
623 (2d Cir. 1978)) (alteration in original). The Supreme Court, however, reversed, stat-
ing that the Court's task was "limited solely to determining whether Congress intended
to create the private right of action asserted." Id. at 568.
96. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
97. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 688 (1979).98. Id.
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before corrective steps can be taken."9 9 The Court further examined
the terms of section 17(a) and noted that they were "forward-look-
ing, not retrospective; it seeks to forestall insolvency, not to provide
recompense after it has occurred."' 10 Thus, the language of the stat-
ute did not support the finding that an implied cause of action Jay in
favor of anyone.' 0 '
The Supreme Court went on to find further support for its conclu-
sion in the statute's remedial scheme. Section 17(a) was flanked by
provisions that explicitly provided for private rights of action. This
showed that "when Congress wished to provide a private damages
remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."' 1 2 The Court
also cited evidence in support of the position that Congress had in-
tended another section to provide an exclusive remedy.'0 3 In the end,
however, when faced with the contention that an implied private
right of action was necessary to effectuate the purposes of section
17(a), the Court revealed its new and highly limiting approach.
While recognizing that Cort set forth four factors, one of which
concerned the goal of effectuating Congress's purpose in enacting the
statute, the Court declared that not all of the factors are equally
significant. "The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended
to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of ac-
tion." 04 Thus, even though the purpose of section 17(a) was to pro-
tect customers from the very kind of false financial reporting alleged
in the case, and despite the fact that the SEC had successfully insti-
gated suits barring the brokerage firms and five of its officers from
conducting business because of their violations of the SEA,10 5 the
Court concluded that here "the statute by its terms grants no private
rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as
unlawful.' 0 6
With respect to plaintiff's contention that the Court had in Borak
previously found an implied cause of action under another provision
of the SEA, in part so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute, the
Court responded that "it suffices to say that in a series of cases since
Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of
99. Id. at 570-71.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 571.
102. Id. at 572.
103. Id. at 573-74.
104. Id. at 575.
105. Id. at 564.
106. Id. at 576.
private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard to-
day.110 7 In short, the Court showed itself to be entirely reluctant to
provide a cause of action that was "significantly broader" than the
remedy Congress had expressly provided because "the ultimate ques-
tion is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court
thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress
enacted into law."'10 8 For these reasons, "it is not for us to fill any
hiatus Congress had left in this area,"109 and so "at least in such a
case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether Congress,
either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right
of action, has been definitely answered in the negative." 110
Thus, the Court in Touche Ross focused on the question of con-
gressional intent, the second Cort factor, almost to the exclusion of
the others. It did not find the fact that plaintiffs belonged to the class
of persons for whose protection the statute was enacted persuasive,
the first Cort factor."' Nor did the Court give any weight to the
proposition that recognition of the right was necessary to effectuate
the goals of the statute, the third Cort factor. It also barely ad-
dressed the issue of the statute's enforcement as matter of federal,
not state concern, the fourth factor. Instead the Court concentrated
on uncovering the intent of Congress by examining the statute's text,
legislative history, and most of all, the statute's enforcement scheme.
Indeed, the Court in Touche Ross based its decision not to grant the
requested implied liability primarily on the nature and scope of the
SEA's enforcement scheme.
Touche Ross is described in detail here to exemplify the radical
shift that took place between 1975 and 1979 in the Court's willing-
ness to find implied rights of action under federal statutes. But be-
yond this, as will be shown below, the enforcement provisions of the
statutes involved in the credit union and savings and loan association
cases, namely the HOLA-FIRREA and the FCUA, 11 are quite sim-
ilar to the SEA's enforcement scheme in precisely those respects that
the Supreme Court in Touche Ross found decisive in denying an
implied right of action. These parallels raise interesting questions re-
garding the appropriateness of fashioning a federal common law pri-
vate right of action where an implied right of action could not be
obtained through the application of the strict Touche Ross standard.
107. Id. at 578.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 579 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
110. Id. at 576.
111. The Court declared: "Certainly the mere fact that § 17(a) was designed to
provide protection for brokers' customers does not require the implication of a private
damages action in their behalf." Id. at 578.
112. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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C. A Comparison of the Enforcement Provisions of the HOLA-
FIRREA, the FCUA, and the SEA
To begin with, the HOLA, the FCUA, and the SEA were all en-
acted during and spurred by the problems of the Great Depres-
sion.113 All three statutes provide for the creation of federal agencies
that promulgate regulations for and oversee the financial integrity of
their respective institutions. The *statutes' enforcement schemes,
which empower the agencies to take action against violators, are also
comparable in orientation and scope. They are "forward-looking," ' 4
113. The HOLA was enacted in 1933; the FCUA and the SEA were passed in
1934.
114. Compare the HOLA's and the FCUA's regulatory scheme set forth respec-
tively in 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1988), repealed in part by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §
407, 103 Stat. 363 (1989), and 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988 & Supp. 1991) with the SEA's
enforcement provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The HOLA,
12 U.S.C. § 1730, allowed the Board to issue cease and desist orders, id. §§ 1730(e), (f);
to suspend or remove directors and officers, id. §§ 1730(g), (h); to pursue judicial en-
forcement of its orders, id. § 1730(k)(2); and to impose civil sanctions, id. §§
1730(k)(3)(A), (P). The FCUA, 12 U.S.C. § 1786, authorizes the NCUA to inquire into
violations of law, rules or regulations, and unsound practices, id. § 1786(e)(I); to issue
cease and desist orders, id. §§ 1786(e)(1), (2); to remove directors, officers, or committee
members, id. §§ 1786(g), (i); to take control of wayward institutions, id. § 1786(h); to
pursue judicial enforcement of its orders and to impose civil sanctions, id. §
1786(k)(2)(A). The SEA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78z, authorizes the Commission to investi-
gate and enjoin violations, id. § 78u; to suspend or revoke the registration of self-regula-
tory organizations for failure to comply with SEC regulations, id. § 78s(h); to suspend or
revoke the registration of any broker for submitting false or misleading statements, id. §
78o(b)(4); to seek judicial enforcement of its orders and to impose civil penalties, id. §
78u-1.
The FIRREA amendments to the HOLA's enforcement scheme expand the HOLA's
prospective provisions. The FIRREA authorizes the OTS, see supra note 5, to impose
higher civil penalties against an association's officers and directors as well as any institu-
tion-affiliated party for certain kinds of wrongdoing, including breach of fiduciary duties.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1991). The FIRREA also institutes a new retro-
spective provision: the Board's replacement, the OTS, now has the authority to proceed
against former officers and directors (the HOLA allowed action to be taken against cur-
rent officers only) as long as notice of the action is served within six years of their depar-
ture from the association. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3) (Supp. III 1991). FIRREA also
authorizes the FDIC to bring civil actions against directors and officers in which they
could be held personally liable for gross negligence or for "conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty of care," such as willful tortious acts. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)
(Supp. III 1991).
Moreover, recently, on September 19, 1991, a United States district court narrowly
construed § 1821(k). The court held that § 1821(k)'s standard of gross negligence pre-
cludes the FDIC from suing former directors for breach of fiduciary duties under state
law because the action required a showing of only simple negligence. FDIC v. Swager,
773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn. 1991). It held so despite the last sentence in 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k), which states that-"[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect
any right of the Corporation [the FDIC] under other applicable law." It would therefore
be difficult to argue that the FIRREA amendments have altered the HOLA's remedial
emphasizing prospective rather than retrospective remedies. This is
to say that they are all oriented toward preventing injury rather than
providing recompense after injury has occurred." 5 The enforcement
schemes in the HOLA, the FCUA, and the SEA are also alike in
another important respect: they contain provisions for private rights
of action in a few limited circumstances, 1 6 though none for the vio-
lations for which plaintiffs sued in Touche Ross, the credit union
cases, or the savings and loan association cases discussed earlier.' 1 7
Admittedly, the regulations allegedly violated in Touche Ross, the
federal credit union cases, and the savings and loan association cases
all address different concerns. In Touche Ross, the regulations dealt
with keeping records and filing financial reports with a government
regulatory body. In the savings and loan association cases, the regu-
lations involved the institutions' lending practices, while in the fed-
eral credit union cases, the regulations provided for the democratic
governance of federal credit unions. Nevertheless, in all these cases,
framework from a forward-looking to a backward-looking scheme, especially if courts
continue to limit the FDIC to actions requiring gross negligence or worse, In any event,
while the FIRREA's remedial framework provides some retrospective remedies that the
HOLA lacked, the majority of the enforcement provisions are still directed toward
preventing insolvency, not toward providing relief after such insolvency has occurred.
115. Indeed, courts that have refused to fashion a federal common law cause of
action in the savings and loan association cases have characterized the HOLA's enforce-
ment scheme as "forward-looking" and have based their decision not to grant the right of
action in part on this finding. E.g., FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th
Cir.1987), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989).
116. The FCUA provides two private rights of action. Officers and directors of
federal credit unions who are removed from office by the NCUA can petition the appro-
priate United States district court to stay the orders. 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (g)(6) (1988 &
Supp. 1991). They are also entitled to judicial review of the NCUA Board's rulings. Id.
§1786 (j)(2). The FIRREA also amended the FCUA to provide another cause of action
for whistleblowing, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See supra note 44 and
accompanying text. With respect to federal savings and loan associations, the HOLA-
FIRREA provides two express private rights of action. One is identical to the aforemen-
tioned FCUA provision that allows removed officers and directors of savings and loan
associations to pursue an administrative hearing and judicial review of the administrative
court's decision. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The other, enacted in 1982,
allows private parties to obtain redress from the association for certain unfair lending
practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (1988). The provisions for express private rights of action
under the SEA to which the Court referred in Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572, namely 15
U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78r(a), and 78t, provide private rights of action in a number of differ-
ent circumstances. Section 78p(b) allows issuers to recover from beneficial owners of
equity securities any profits derived from their sale and purchase. Section 78r(a) allows
customers who purchased or sold securities in reliance on § 17(a) reports to recover
losses incurred as a result of false or misleading statements contained in the reports. And
finally § 78t makes jointly and severally liable "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly,
controls any person liable under any provision."
117. Thus, if Congress demonstrated in the SEA that it knew how to fashion a
private right of action when it wished to provide one, then Congress certainly exhibited
the same capacities in the FCUA and the FIRREA.
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plaintiffs faced the same legal predicament: "forward-looking" en-
forcement schemes that provide express rights of action in some cir-
cumstances but which were mute on the availability of private rights
of action for the particular regulatory violations asserted. Moreover,
in all cases the "forward-looking" regulations failed to prevent the
damage for which plaintiff instigated suit, a problem which the Su-
preme Court in Touche Ross did not find compelling.
Plaintiffs in the federal credit union cases and the savings and
loan association cases presented earlier thus stood on similar footing
as plaintiffs in Touche Ross with respect to the possibility of ob-
taining redress for the damage incurred as a result of the violation of
the federal statutes.' 1 8 Plaintiffs in Touche Ross were unsuccessful
in their attempt precisely because the SEA's enforcement scheme
supported the presumption that the remedies Congress had provided
were exclusive. Thus, one would expect that the same conclusion
would hold in the federal credit union and savings and loan associa-
tion cases. And indeed, plaintiffs in these cases were denied implied
private rights of action.
However, some lower federal courts did not end the inquiry there,
as the Court in Touche Ross directed, but instead provided plaintiffs
with a cause of action under federal common law. Their decision to
do so is all the more surprising in light of the similarity in enforce-
ment schemes between the SEA, the FCUA, and the HOLA de-
scribed above and the strong message delivered by the Court in
Touche Ross against judicially created rights of action. In short, it
appears that those courts which turned to federal common law to
provide the relief sought by plaintiffs were in effect circumventing
the limitations the Supreme Court had placed upon their authority
to fashion law.
In Barany v. Buller," 9 however, the court cited several Supreme
Court cases to support the proposition that the failure to find an im-
plied cause of action under the statute did not preclude the consider-
ation of federal common law as a remedial source. Therefore, before
determining whether the lower federal courts in Barany, Rosenberg
118. Indeed, it appears that plaintiffs in federal credit union cases were worse off
than plaintiffs in the savings and loan association cases, as the NCUA refused to become
involved in their governance disputes. See supra text accompanying note 36. One reason
why the NCUA may have chosen not to become involved is because the bylaws allegedly
violated in these cases did not impact the financial integrity of the thrift. If so, this fact
should influence a court's decision whether to fashion federal common law. See discus-
sion infra part IV.D.
119. 670 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1982).
v. AT&T Employees Federal Credit Union,12 0 Eureka Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association v. Kidwell,12 1 and First Hawaiian Bank
v. Alexander1 22 all overstepped their authority in providing relief
under federal common law, one must consider whether the Supreme
Court cases cited by these courts as supporting precedent substanti-
ate their decisions.
D. Relevant Supreme Court Precedents on the Consideration
of Federal Common Law as an Alternative Source
for the Remedy Sought by Plaintiff
In support of its decision to consider formulating a federal com-
mon law cause of action when none could be implied under the
FCUA, the Barany court cited Middlesex County Sewerage Author-
ity v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n'2 3 for the proposition that a
court can consider alternative sources for federal remedies. 124 In
Middlesex County, the Court found that no private right of action
could be implied under either one of the pertinent federal acts.12"
Yet, as the Barany court noted, the Court then considered sua
sponte the possibility of providing the requested relief under a differ-
ent federal statute.2 6 In Middlesex County, however, the Court did
not consider whether federal common law could provide the remedy
or give any indication that such consideration would be justified. 27
120. 726 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1989).
121. 672 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
122. 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw. 1983).
123. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
124. Barany, 670 F. 2d at 731.
125. Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 17-18. The pertinent federal acts were the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §1251 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33
U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 4.
126. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731. The statute under consideration by the Court was
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 19.
127. On the contrary, it clearly demonstrated its reluctance to provide any addi-
tional avenues for enforcement beyond those expressly contemplated in the statutes by
denying plaintiffs' cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite the fact that both the
FWPCA and the MPRSA contained "saving clauses" which indicated Congressional in-
tent to preserve any rights plaintiffs may have under "any statute or common law." Mid-
dlesex County, 453 U.S. at 9. The Court reasoned that the comprehensive nature of both
the FWPCA and the MPRSA enforcement schemes made it "hard to believe that Con-
gress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific
statutory remedies .. " Id. at 20. In his dissent, Justice Stevens adamantly rejected the
majority's notion that the saving clause did not evidence congressional intent to preserve
§ 1983 remedies and read the saving clause so as to include §1983: "Respondent's right
to proceed under § 1983 in light of these statutory provisions could have been made more
plain only had Congress substituted the citation '42 U.S.C. § 1983' for the words 'any
statute' in the saving clauses." Id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, he also
gave considerably more weight than did the majority to the Senate and House reports as
indicating Congress's intentions with respect to the saving clauses:
The legislative history of both statutes makes it clear that the saving clauses
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Thus, while Middlesex County may be viewed as allowing a court to
consider other legislative acts when determining whether a remedy is
available, it does not support the notion that judicially created fed-
eral common law may also be considered when there is no implied
right of action.
The Barany court also cited Northwest Airlines v. Transport
Workers Union of America'18 and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc."' in support of its decision to consider federal com-
mon law.'30 In so doing, the Barany court pointed out that in those
cases the Supreme Court considered federal common law as a source
of federal remedy.' 31 The Barany court then concluded that while
the Court had ultimately refused to fashion law, its rationale was not
applicable to the case before it.'32 Both Northwest Airlines v. Trans-
port Workers Union of America and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Rad-
cliff Materials, Inc. were distinguishable. Whereas the common law
did not provide the right to contribution'33 sought by plaintiffs in
both Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, in the instant case
"the common law does provide the asserted remedy in a quo war-
ranto proceeding.'3 4 In addition, "conflicting policy arguments re-
garding recognition of the asserted contribution remedy" had been
raised in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, while in Barany
"the only question is which law-state or federal-provides the as-
serted remedy, not whether the remedy should exist at all.' 3 5
were intended to mean what they say. The Senate Report on the Clear Water
Act states:
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve
any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be
shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with require-
ments under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for
pollution damages."
And the corresponding report on the MPRSA similarly states that the authori-
zation of citizen suits shall not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal
action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the com-
mon law."
Id. at 29-30 (citations omitted).
128. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
129. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
130. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731 n.9.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. "A right to contribution is recognized when two or more persons are liable to
the same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors has paid more than
his fair share of the common liability." Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87-88.
134. Barany, 670 F.2d at 731 n.9.
135. Id.
A close reading of both Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries,
however, reveals that the notion that the common law does not pro-
vide a contribution remedy was not dispositive in either case. 38 In
addition, the Court in Northwest Airlines weighed the conflicting
policy arguments137 not to determine whether the right to contribu-
tion existed under the statute,1 8 but to point out that the federal
courts should refrain from altering "'the balance struck by Congress
in procedural statutes by favoring one side or the other in matters of
statutory construction.' ",'3' The Court's refusal to grant the right
was not based on the policy conflict, as suggested in Barany. Rather
the Court emphasized the policy conflict to remind the lower federal
courts of the limited role they play in our system of jurisprudence,
particularly in providing relief where federal statutes are
implicated. 40
The Barany court also distinguished Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries on the grounds that the enforcement provision con-
tained in the FCUA and the HOLA were not as comprehensive as
those analyzed in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries.14 1 Yet
in both Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the Court applied
136. The Supreme Court actually noted that while a right to contribution was not
originally part of the common law, the rule has been abrogated by most states. North-
west Airlines, 451 U.S. at 86-87. With respect to a federal right to contribution, the
Court acknowledged that while there was also no initial right to contribution under fed-
eral law, the modern trend among the lower federal courts was to recognize the right. Id.
at 84 n.10. Later on, however, the Court asserted that it itself had never found such a
right. Id. at 96-97.
137. Here, petitioner Northwest Airlines asserted a right to contribution under the
same federal statutes it'had been found to have violated in a previous case, namely the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2 (1976). Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 79 nn.l & 2.
Petitioner sought contribution from the union representing its employees that had alleg-
edly been at least partially responsible for the statutory violations. Northwest Airlines,
451 U.S. at 82. The policy arguments addressed the question of whether the recognition
of a right to contribution would serve the purposes of the acts and promote its underlying
policies. Id. at 89.
138. In fact, the court approached the problem assuming that all the elements of a
contribution claim were established, including the assumption that the statute's policy
considerations supported the recognition of the right. Id. at 89-90.
139. Id. at 98 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
140. Thus the Court declared:
In this case .... a favorable reaction to the equitable considerations supporting
petitioner's contribution claim is not a sufficient reason for enlarging on the
remedial provisions contained in these carefully considered statutes.
Whatever may be a federal court's power to fashion remedies in other areas
of the law, we are satisfied that it would be improper for us to add a right to
contribution to the statutory rights that Congress created in the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII.
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
141. Barany, 670 F.2d at 736. The First Hawaiian Bank court also alluded to this
when it pointed out that "the HOLA's remedial scheme does not provide the kind of
remedy requested by the plaintiff." First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp.
1128, 1132 (1983).
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the four-factor Cort test'42 and refused to recognize the right to con-
tribution because the "comprehensive character of the remedial
scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences an intent
not to authorize additional remedies.' 43 In the final analysis, the
same factors that led the court to deny the claim for an implied
cause of action in Touche Ross also compelled the Court to deny the
implication of a right to contribution in both Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries.
The Court was also equally clear in denying a right to contribu-
tion under federal common law in both Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries. In Northwest Airlines, the Court recognized that
the federal courts have, in the absence of legislation, a "responsibil-
ity . . . to fashion federal common law in cases raising issues of
uniquely federal concern.' 44 Nonetheless, the authority to interpret
a statute is "fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not
to adopt."' 45 One should also note that the Court in Northwest Air-
lines did not declare outright that it lacked the power to fashion the
remedy requested. This was to come in Texas Industries, where the
Court approached the issue of the right to contribution in terms of
"can" rather than "should."
The Court in Texas Industries 46 determined that the dispositive
question was "whether courts have the power to create such a cause
of action absent legislation, and if so, whether that authority should
be exercised in this context."' 147 But the Court never reached the sec-
ond part of the question as it answered the first in the negative. In so
doing, the Court attempted to define the lawmaking powers of the
142. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91-94; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 639-
40.
143. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 93-94. In Texas Industries, the Court noted:
"It does not necessarily follow, however, that Congress intended to give the courts as
wide discretion in formulating remedies to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act or
the kind of relief sought through contribution." Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 643.
144. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95.
145. Id. at 97. The Court furthermore stated that unlike their state counterparts,
the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with limited lawmaking powers, a
power which is "vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government .... .
Id. at 95. Hence, "once Congress addresses a subject, even a subject previously governed
by federal common law, the justification for lawmaking by the federal courts is greatly
diminished. Thereafter, the task of the federal courts is to interpret and apply statutory
law, not to create common law." Id. at 95 n.34.
146. Plaintiffs in Texas Industries had been found liable for violating the antitrust
laws and sought a right to contribution from the other participants in the unlawful con-
spiracy. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 632-33.
147. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
federal courts.1" 8 The federal courts, it noted, could fashion federal
common law, but only in a "'few and restricted' ",149 instances:
where it was " 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests' "1"
and where Congress had "given the courts the power to develop sub-
stantive law. ' 151 Texas Industries fell under the second category. In
this regard the Court noted that it had previously construed the first
two sections of the Sherman Act, the act in question in the case, as
granting the federal courts the power to develop substantive law. But
this was not to say that the Court had the power to grant the relief
requested. Congress had given the federal courts the authority to de-
fine violations of the antitrust acts, but it had not "intended to give
courts as wide discretion in formulating remedies." '52 This was evi-
dent from the "detailed and specific"1 53 remedial provisions of both
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which contrasted with the broad,
sweeping language of the first two sections of the Sherman Act.
Thus, once again, this time in the context of considering the availa-
bility of a federal common law right to contribution, the Court re-
fused to broaden an act's remedial scheme, noting that "'t]he
presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute
is strongest when Congress had enacted a comprehensive legislative
scheme.' ",154
E. Preliminary Conclusions
While the Court in both Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries
considered the possibility of fashioning the federal common law
cause of action requested by plaintiff, in neither case did it proceed
to fashion one. Most important, the Court refused to create the
cause of action under federal common law for the very same reason
it refused to find one implicit in the relevant federal statutes: the
statutes in question provided a comprehensive scheme of enforce-
ment that reflected Congress's intent to exclude all other remedies.
148. As most commentators have pointed out, the scope of the federal courts' law-
making powers is quite nebulous. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 79 (1980), where Professor Redish
writes: "At no time has the Supreme Court definitively explained either the principles
which determine when courts should resort to federal common law or the specific catego-
ries of situations to which federal common law will apply." Although Professor Redish
made this statement in 1980, the problems in defining the extent of the federal court's
authority to develop common law remain to this day. For other views, see infra note 160.
149. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 651 (1963)).
150. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426
(1964)).
151. Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
152. Id. at 643.
153. Id. at 644.
154. Id. at 645 (quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97).
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In this respect, the Court could not have made its reasoning more
clear: the judiciary should not interfere with the delicate balance of
interests embodied in the scheme by broadening it to include private
rights of action that Congress presumably considered and rejected,
even when doing so would promote the purposes of the statute and
thus improve on the statutory scheme. The federal courts' primary
function is to apply the law, not to make it. This, in short, constitutes
the Supreme Court's current view on the subject of judicially created
rights of action whether the right of action is to be implied from the
statute or created under federal common law.
From this vantage point, the decision of the Barany court and its
progeny to consider federal common law seems misguided. Indeed, it
appears that the comprehensiveness of a particular statute's remedial
scheme is just as dispositive when considering the formulation of a
new cause of action under federal common law as it is when consid-
ering whether one should be implied from a statute. This finding fur-
ther supports the proposition that the courts in Barany, Rosenberg,
First Hawaiian Bank, and Kidwell may all have overstepped their
authority in formulating a cause of action under federal common law
where none could be implied from the statute because of the compre-
hensive nature of the statute's remedial scheme.
Yet it should also be pointed out that in both Northwest Airlines
and Texas Industries, the Court derived its authority to fashion law
from the second category of instances that authorizes the formula-
tion of federal common law: a grant of Congress to develop substan-
tive law. Moreover, the Court construed those grants as delimiting
its competence to develop substantive law in the area of remedies.
This point did not go unnoticed by the court in Barany. In support of
its decision to fashion federal common law, the Barany court indi-
cated that in contrast to Texas Industries, in which no unique fed-
eral interest was implicated, in the case before it a unique federal
interest in the uniform regulation of federal financial institutions was
evident from the statute's legislative history. 55 Thus, before conclud-
ing that the Barany court and its progeny should have refrained
from turning to federal common law as an alternative source for the
asserted right, one must answer two questions. First, does the regula-
tion of the internal affairs of federal credit unions and savings and
loan associations represent a uniquely federal interest justifying the
fashioning of federal common law? Second, what limits, if any, has
155. Barany, 670 F.2d 736 n.21.
the Supreme Court placed on the federal courts' lawmaking powers
when uniquely federal interests are involved?
IV. UNIQUELY FEDERAL INTERESTS AND THE AUTHORITY OF
FEDERAL COURTS TO FASHION FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. Introduction
As noted earlier, in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc.'" the Court declared that absent congressional authority, fed-
eral courts could fashion federal common law in two limited in-
stances: "those in which a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests," 5 . . . and those in which Con-
gress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law. '" ' 8
The Court further defined the category of uniquely federal interests
as constituting "such narrow areas as those concerned with the
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and interna-
tional disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our re-
lations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases."' 59 Yet apart from
connecting the concept of uniquely federal interests to that of na-
tional sovereignty, the Supreme Court did little else to define the
rights and obligations of the United States and thus the meaning of
uniquely federal interests. Indeed, it appears that the Court has
never clearly defined the conditions under which the rights and du-
ties of the United States are affected. Consequently, lower federal
courts have been unable to ascertain when they have the authority to
fashion federal common law. This explains why the competence of
federal courts to formulate rules of decision continues to be the sub-
ject of heated debate among commentators of the law and the lower
federal courts alike.' 60
156. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
157. Id. at 640 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426
(1964)).
158. Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
159. Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
160. For example, Professor Martha A. Field writes that "no meaningful limits to
make federal common law have been articulated or adopted, and that the bounds of
federal common law are potentially much broader than is generally supposed." Martha
A. Field, Sources of the Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L, REV.
883. 884 (1986). Professor Field goes on to contend that the current approach gives the
courts broad powers to make federal common law, contrary to the traditional view that
courts are competent to formulate law only in certain areas. Id. at 886-88. But while
Professor Field attacks the traditional position, stating that "[c]ommentators typically
simply list areas in which federal common law is acceptable without providing any ani-
mating principle to unify the categories," id. at 886 (footnote omitted), she later notes
that "[ilnstead, the central issue in all cases is the degree of federal need for a federal
rule, and the degree to which that rule would impinge upon state interests," id. at 888.
As will be shown, this Comment agrees with Professor Field in that the formulation of
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This Part will focus on a number of the most pertinent l6  Supreme
Court decisions to examine the nature of uniquely federal interests
with respect to the rights and duties of the United States. The find-
ings will then be applied to determine whether the uniform regula-
tion of federal financial institutions constitutes a uniquely federal
federal common law does not depend on whether the federal interests involved may be
substantively categorized as a type of interest justifying lawmaking, but submits that the
critical question is whether there is a federal interest in need of protection, see infra part
lV.C.
P. Bator, P. Mission, D. Shapiro, and H. Wechsler also write that after Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), the substantive limits of federal common law were unknown
because the doctrine applied in "a wide area of general, unwritten commercial law,
marked off only with difficulty from property and other matters of 'local law.'" PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 700 (2d ed. 1973). And as recently as 1989, Professor Louise Weinberg noted: "I
take it that there are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of
decision. I will call this 'the true position.'" Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989). Professor Weinberg later indicates, however, that "'the
official position'" is that federal common law can be fashioned "only in a few discrete,
narrow areas, where uniquely federal interests are at stake." Id. at 807-08 (footnote
omitted). Her proposition is that the limitations placed on federal judge-made law are
wrong. Id. at 806. They are wrong because "the lawmaking power of a sovereign is co-
extensive with its sphere of governmental interest," and "[t]he judiciary must have pre-
sumptive power to adjudicate whatever the legislature and the executive can act upon.
Without this principle we cease to be a nation of laws." Id. at 813.
161. This Comment is primarily concerned with the development of federal com-
mon law based on federal statutes. It will not examine federal common law that derives
from the Constitution because the authority and proclivity of the federal courts to formu-
late federal common law may differ depending on whether the Constitution or a federal
statute is involved. For example, the Supreme Court seems more willing to fashion new
private rights of action when the source of the right is the Constitution rather than a
federal statute, In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court declared:
[T]he question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different
from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the
Constitution.
Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is en-
tirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these rights and obligations, to de-
termine in addition who may enforce them and in what manner. For example,
statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regulatory
schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private action, they may nev-
ertheless be enforced through alternative mechanisms ....
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of the prolixity of a
legal code." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). It speaks in-
stead with a majestic simplicity. One of "its important objects" . . . is the
designation of rights. And in "its great outlines" . . . the judiciary is clearly
discernible as the primary means through which these rights may be enforced.
Id. at 241 (citations omitted). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1949) (holding that the Constitution supports an implied fed-
eral cause of action for damages resulting from violations of constitutional rights). Thus,
it would not be proper or correct to apply principles derived from constitutional federal
common law cases to disputes where the rights of action asserted stem from a federal
statute.
interest as proposed by Barany v. Buller12 and its progeny.
B. Supreme Court Precedents on Federal Common Law
In the landmark decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 6 3 the
Court overturned Swift v. Tyson16 4 in holding that "except in mat-
ters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."' 65 Hence-
forth, there was to be "no federal general common law.' 6 As men-
tioned earlier, however, Erie did not altogether strip the federal
courts of their lawmaking power. As Justice Jackson declared four
years later in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC"
The federal courts have no general common law .... But this is not to say
that wherever we have occasion to decide a federal question which cannot
be answered from federal statutes alone we may not resort to all of the
source materials of the common law, or that when we have fashioned an
answer it does not become a part of the federal non-statutory or common
law.' 6 8
Thus, shortly after in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,6 ' the
Court held that federal, not state law governed the rights and obliga-
tions of the United States on the commercial papers it issues.17 0 The
court stated that the authority of the United States to issue checks
arose from the Constitution and certain federal statutes and that it
"was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any
other state.'1'. Moreover, the rights and duties imposed on the
United States as a result of the issuance of such commercial paper
"find their roots in the same federal sources.' 1 72 The Court went on
to declare that "[i]n absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is
for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according
to their own standards."'1 3 These statements suggest that when the
source of the right is federal and Congress has not spoken on the
issue, the rule of law should be federal.
The Court, however, did not base its decision to apply a federal
rule of decision of its own making on the federal nature of the
162. 670 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1982).
163. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
164. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Court held that federal courts exer-
cising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship need not apply state law to resolve the
dispute before them. Id. at 18-19.
165. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
166. Id.
167. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
168. Id. at 469 (Jackson, J., concurring).
169. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
170. Id. at 366-67.
171. Id. at 366.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 367.
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sources supporting the right. The Court recognized that it could
choose and had previously chosen state law as the applicable federal
rule. Nevertheless, in the case before it, this would be "singularly
inappropriate." 174 Not only would "[t]he application of state law...
subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional un-
certainty," "[i]t would also lead to great diversity in results by mak-
ing identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states. 17 5 For these reasons, a uniform federal rule was in
order.17
6
Thus, the Court decided to fashion a federal rule not so much
because the Constitution and federal laws were implicated- that
merely defined the matter as federal-but rather because uniformity
was needed to protect the rights and duties of the United States in
the area of commercial paper.17 7
However, such protection of the rights and obligations of the
United States was not always deemed necessary. In United States v.
Yazell,1 8 the federal government asked the Court to develop federal
common law so that it could collect on the balance of a loan made to
Mrs. Yazell by the Small Business Administration (SBA)179 Not-
withstanding the federal interest involved, the Court decided not to
fashion a federal rule. 8 In reaching this decision, the Court repeat-
edly emphasized the nature of the SBA contract with Mrs. Yazell as
a "custom-made, hand-tailored, specifically negotiated transac-
tion."' Unlike the issuance of checks in Clearfield, "[i]t was not a
nationwide act of the Federal Government, emanating in a single




177. At this early time, the concept of uniquely federal interest had not yet been
developed. Rather, questions regarding the formulation of federal common law turned on
whether the dispute implicated the rights and duties of the United States under federal
statutes.
178. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
179. Id. at 348-49. Mrs. Yazell contended that state law should apply which, at
the time the contract was executed, provided that a married woman could not bind her
separate property without a court decree removing her disability to contract. No such
court decree had been issued, so Mrs. Yazell claimed she was not liable. Id. at 342-43.
The Court acknowledged that the state law of coverture was "peculiar and obsolete," id.
at 351, and that as a creditor, the United States had a legitimate federal interest in
collecting on the loan, id. at 348.
180. Id. at 352.
181. Id. at 347-48.
182. Id. at 348.
law."' 83 Because the Government was clearly able to follow local
procedural requirements to obtain enforceable security interests,
"[t]here is no problem in complying with state law" and so "[t]here
is here no need for uniformity.' 84 In support of its decision, the
Court reiterated that its prior rulings in favor of formulating federal
law had all typically involved "programs and actions which by their
nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Na-
tion." 18 5 In short, state law should be superseded, the Court de-
clared, only when "clear and substantial interests of the National
Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for
such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is
applied." 86
After Y'azell, the Court continued to limit the development of fed-
eral common law. In Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,181
the question once again was whether federal or state law governed.
The answer affected the rights of private parties in an oil and gas
lease issued under a federal statute, 88 the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920.89 In both Clearfield and Yazell, the Court had answered this
question by first determining whether the dispute involved a federal
rather than state matter. If the dispute involved a federal matter, the
Court would then proceed to consider whether a uniform federal rule
of decision was necessary. The Court in Wallis, however, deviated
from this established analytical approach. In deciding not to formu-
late federal common law, it focused on the second part of the analy-
sis, ignoring the first altogether. State law, not federal law, applied
because "we find no significant threat to any identifiable federal pol-
icy or interest."' 90 In so holding, the Court declared that "the guid-
ing principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy
183. Id. at 357.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 354.
186. Id. at 352.
187. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
188. Id. at 67.
189. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
190. Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68. One could point out that by concluding that no fed-
eral policy or interests were implicated in the dispute, the Court did indeed consider and
answer in the negative the question of whether the matter was federal. Nevertheless, it
reached this decision in a swift manner, giving little consideration to the plaintiff's con-
tention that since the rights and duties derived from a federal statute, the matter was
feddral. More important, the Court's decision resulted in the narrowing of opportunities
for characterizing disputes as federal and in further limiting the power of the federal
courts to formulate common law. It achieved this result by making clear that the decision
of whether a matter is federal turns on whether the federal government's rights and
duties are implicated and not on whether federal rights held by private parties are in-
volved, even when the rights and duties of the private parties derive from a federal
source. As will become evident, this is exactly what the Court indicated in subsequent
cases where the issue of private rights of action based on federal statutes or contracts
arose. See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
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or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically
shown."191 The Court then proceeded to limit the federal courts' au-
thority to formulate federal rules, declaring that "[i]t is by no means
enough that, as we may assume, Congress could under the Constitu-
tion readily enact a complete code of law governing transactions in
federal mineral leases among private parties. Whether latent federal
power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a deci-
sion for Congress. '"192
The significance of Wallis with respect to federal common law is
not that the Court failed to follow its own test for determining when
federal common law could be applied. Rather, Wallis's significance
lies in setting forth the requirement of a "significant"' 93 conflict with
state law. The fact that the Court failed to address the question of
whether uniformity presented a "substantial" federal interest is also
significant. Indeed, the Court's insistence that an identifiable conflict
with state law must be specifically shown before federal common law
could be fashioned suggested that the need for uniformity might not
suffice.' 9 4 Nevertheless, the Court did not so hold but left the ques-
tion open. It thus appears that at the time of Wallis,'95 the federal
courts could support the fashioning of federal common law through
either the Clearfield-Yazell approach or the narrower Wallis ap-
proach. The Clearfield-Yazell approach gave the federal courts free-
dom to fashion federal common law, even absent a "specifically
shown" conflict with state law, when Congress had not addressed the
191. Id. Note that the kind of conflict the Court refers to is not an Erie type of
conflict, that is, one between state statutory or common law and federal common law, but
rather a conflict of interests or policies between a state and the federal government.
192. Id.
193. At first sight, the Court's decision -in Wallis seems to conflict with its prior
rulings in Clearfield and Yazell, where the Court found authority to fashion federal law
in the federal sources implicated and the national nature of the program involved and
made no mention of the need for a conflict with state law. The Court in Clearfield main-
tained that in the absence of legislation, "it is for the federal courts to fashion the gov-
erning rule of law according to their own standards." Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367. And in
Yazell, the Court noted that "in the cases applying state law to limit or condition the
enforcement of a federal right, the Court has insisted that the state law is being 'adopted'
as the federal rule." YazelI, 382 U.S. at 356. Yet in both Clearfield and Yazell, the
Court recognized, albeit implicitly, the existence of a conflict between a state interest and
a federal interest, that of uniformity, finding the federal interest paramount in the former
case and in no need of protection in the latter.
194. Consider that in introducing the Wallis conflict approach, the Court made no
mention of Clearfield, nor of the need for uniformity as a possible federal interest, an
interest that automatically conflicts with state law and which the Court in Clearfield
found to favor heavily the application of federal common law.
195. The decision in Wallis was handed down in 1966.
issue at bar, the matter was deemed to be federal, and uniformity of
law was required for the successful operation of a nationwide federal
program. The Wallis approach, on the other hand, restricted the
courts' lawmaking powers to only those instances in which a federal
interest substantially conflicted with state law even when the matter
was deemed federal.196
That federal courts continued to have the power to fashion sub-
stantive law in federal matters, particularly when the issues involve
the operation of a nationwide federal program, is apparent from sev-
eral other Supreme Court decisions. Consider both United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co. 191 and United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.19 In Little Lake, the United States sought to quiet title to two
parcels of land 99 acquired under the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act.10 In reaching the decision that federal, not state law governed
the interpretation of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, the Court
relied heavily on the fact that the land acquisitions arose from and
bore heavily upon a federal regulatory program. 01 In respect to the
issue of judicial lawmaking, the Court declared:
There will often be no specific federal legislation governing a particular
transaction to which the United States is a party; here, for example, no
provision of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act guides us to choose state
or federal law in interpreting federal land acquisition agreements under the
Act. But silence on that score in federal legislation is no reason for limiting
the reach of federal law .... To the contrary, the inevitable incompleteness
presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a
basic responsibility of the federal courts.20 2
Thus the Court clearly established the lawmaking powers of the
federal courts where federal legislation is involved, and particularly
where legislation creates nationwide federal programs. Moreover, it
did so by maintaining that it had a constitutional responsibility for
assuring the effectuation of the statutory purposes enacted by
Congress. 0 3
196. This difference in approach was recently dealt with by the Court in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See infra notes 224-34 and accompa-
nying text.
197. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
198. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
199. Although one parcel was bought outright and the other by condemnation,
both the sale and the condemnation judgment reserved to Little Lake the mineral and oil
rights for a specified period. Little Lake, 412 U.S. at 582. The district court found that
under the terms of these instruments, fee title in the United States ripened, extinguishing
Little Lake's mineral rights. Id. at 583. Little Lake, however, contended that a state
statute enacted after the contracts were entered into invalidated the United States' rights
to assign the mineral rights. Id. at 584. In the end, both the district court and the court
of appeals ruled in favor of Little Lake. Id.
200. 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1926).
201. Little Lake, 412 U.S. at 592.
202. Id. at 593.
203. Id. As noted earlier, this was not the first time the Court insisted that it had
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Similarly in Kimbell, the Court faced the decision of whether a
national rule was necessary in order to protect the interests of the
United States as a creditor.0 4 In reaching the decision that state
commercial law should govern, the Court reiterated its position that
"federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United
States arising under nationwide federal programs."20 5 Citing Little
Lake and Clearfield, the Court went on to declare: "It is precisely
when Congress has not spoken 'in an area comprising issues substan-
tially related to an established program of government operation,'20
that Clearfield directs federal courts to fill the interstices of federal
legislation 'according to their own standards.' "207 The actual content
of the federal rule, however, was a difficult matter that could only be
determined after noting"'a variety of considerations always relevant
to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects
upon them of applying state law."120 8
the power and the duty to develop law for the purpose of forwarding the policies and
purposes of federal legislation. See D'Oench, D'Hume & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,
470 (1942), where Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion declared: "Were we bereft
of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recog-
nized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms
of the Constitution itself." Id. at 470 (Jackson, J., concurring).
204. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 718. The United States had made a loan and accepted
as security certain personal property that had also been accepted as security by a private
creditor. Both the government and the private creditor had initiated proceedings to fore-
close on the collateral, each claiming priority over the other. Id. at 718-25. The Court,
after determining that the federal act under which the federal loan was made did not
specify priority rules to govern security interests, declared that although the matter was
federal, state law would be adopted as the federal rule. Id. at 740.
205. Id. at 726.
206. Id. at 727 (quoting LittleLake, 412 U.S. at 593 (quoting Paul J. Mishkin,
The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of Na-
tional and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957))).
207. Id. (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
208. Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310
(1947)). Two of these considerations involved the question of the need for uniformity and
whether application of state law would frustrate the specific objectives of the federal
programs. Id. The Court also noted the importance of ascertaining the extent to which
application of a national rule would disrupt commercial transactions predicated on state
law. Id. at 729. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the Court concluded that
no uniform rule was necessary to protect the interests of the United States since compli-
ance with state law "would produce no hardship on the agency," id. at 730, nor "frus-
trate the objectives of the lending programs," id. at 734. State law would apply as the
federal rule for the same reasons as in Yazell. Although the agency regulations no longer
contained admonitions to follow state law, each loan was still individually negotiated "in
painful particularized detail." Id. at 730 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,
345-46 (1966)). The regulations themselves suggested that state law would determine the
priority of liens where the federal statutes or regulations were not controlling. Id. at 731-
32. For these reasons, the government's contention that application of state law would
frustrate the purposes of the lending programs was without merit.
Thus, the Court has shown itself to be quite solicitous of the rights
and interests of the federal government and quite willing to fashion
federal rules of decision for their protection. This is true regardless
of which method, Clearfield-Yazell or Wallis, the Court chooses to
justify its lawmaking powers or, just as important, the nature of the
federal interest involved. As has been shown, the content of the in-
terest can be as diverse as the policies underlying federal legislation
or the objectives of federal programs. However, not all federal inter-
ests qualify. As Wallis intimated, when the source of the right is
federal but the dispute is between private parties, there may be no
federal interest worthy of the Court's protection.20 9 In other words, it
is not enough that the interest derive from a federal source; it must
also directly affect the rights and duties of the federal government
for the Court to have the authority to make law. Thus, in Bank of
America Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Parnell,210 the Court refused to
fashion federal law because "[t]he present litigation is purely be-
tween private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the
United States."21'
In Parnell, petitioner Bank of America brought suit in federal dis-
trict court alleging that the defendants had converted government
bonds which had previously disappeared while being prepared by the
Petitioner for presentation to the Federal Reserve Bank for pay-
ment.212 Defendants contended, and the court of appeals held, that
the issue was governed by the rule in Clearfied.21 3 The Court, how-
ever, declared that their reliance on Clearfield was misguided: "[t]he
only possible interest of the United States in a situation like the one
here, exclusively involving the transfer of Government paper between
private persons ... is far too speculative, far too remote a possibility
to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of
local concern. 21 4
209. Recall that in Wallis, two private parties each claimed rightful ownership of
an oil and gas lease to federal land. The Court did not explicitly say that federal common
law cannot be formulated when the dispute is between private parties and there is no
significant federal interest involved, but it came close when it stated that "[alpart from
the highly abstract nature of this interest [that of using federal law to settle disputes
between private parties over federal land], there has been no showing that state law is
not adequate to achieve it." Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966).
See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
210. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
211. Id. at 33. Clearfield "compels the application of federal law to the entire
case." Id.
212. Id. at 30-31.
213. Id. at 33.
214. Id. at 33-34. The dissenters pointed to the uncertainty that would follow from
the Court's decision, underscoring the "virtue of a uniform law governing bonds, notes,
and other paper issues by the United States," so that one set of rules would govern the
rights of all parties to government paper rather than fifty. Id. at 35. Yet the majority
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Parnell is not the only case where the Court has shown its reluc-
tance to fashion common law absent a clear federal interest implicat-
ing the rights and duties of the United States. In Miree v. DeKalb
County,21 5 the Court recognized that "the United States [had] a
substantial interest"2116 in the matter before it; nevertheless, it held
that state law should govern the claim because "only the rights of
private litigants are at issue here," 217 and their claim "will have no
direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury."21 Thus, it ap-
pears that unless uniformity is necessary to protect the operation of a
federal program, uniformity by itself will not call into action the
Court's protective lawmaking powers, and neither will certain fed-
eral policies, namely those that do not directly impact the rights and
obligations of the federal government and, in particular, its treasury.
This is not to say that the Court has always fashioned itself to be
the protector of the treasury. In United States v. Standard Oil
Co.,219 the federal government brought suit to recover the amount it
had expended for the hospitalization and loss of service of a soldier
who was injured when struck by defendant's truck.2 20 The Court
found that no uniformity was necessary, thus bringing into question the notion that uni-
formity is important for its own sake. But one should not forget that in Clearfield it was
the government and not private parties that would be subject to the vagaries of state law
absent a uniform federal rule. Moreover, in Clearfield the federal government stood to
pay twice if state law applied, whereas in Parnell the federal government was obliged to
pay only once regardless of whether federal or state law governed. In this respect, the
majority in Parnell was correct in its assessment that the only federal interest involved
was "far too speculative, far too remote" since the government would not be subject to
any loss under state law. Id. at 33-34.
215. 433 U.S. 25 (1977). Here, survivors of deceased aircraft passengers petitioned
the Court to fashion federal common law allowing them to sue as third-party benefi-
ciaries to a contract between the Federal Aviation Administration and the county. The
contract called upon the county "to restrict the use of land adjacent to ... the Airport to
activities and purposes compatible with normal airport operations including landing and
takeoff of aircraft." Id. at 27. The county breached the provision by operating a garbage
dump near the airport which allegedly attracted a swarm of birds, causing a plane to
crash.
216. Id. at 31 (referring to the regulation and promotion of air travel safety).
217. Id. at 30.
218. Id. at 29.
219. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
220. Id. at 302. Although state law provided that masters could recover for loss of
servants' services, the United States could not because the government-soldier relation-
ship was not encompassed by the scope of the state statute and because " 'the govern-
ment is not a "master" and the soldier is not a "servant" within the meaning of the
[state] Code section.' " Id. at 304 n.4 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States,
153 F.2d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 1946)). The United States sought to avoid the state rule,
contending that federal, not state law, controlled since the issue presented a federal ques-
tion. Id. at 305.
wholeheartedly agreed with the federal government's contention that
the relationship between the government and members of the armed
forces was a federal matter.21 Yet it refused to fashion a federal
rule in favor of the government because: "Whatever the merits of
the-policy, its conversion into law is a proper subject for congres-
sional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this
Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the national
purse. '222
One should observe that while the government in Standard Oil
had a substantial interest in the dispute, there was actually no real
conflict of laws or interests involved because there was no federal law
per se with which state law conflicted and because there was no state
policy or interest precluding recovery since state law allowed recov-
ery in similar master-servant situations. The main problem with the
state law was that it was not broad enough to include the govern-
ment-soldier relationship. In addition, had the Court acted in favor
of the government, it would have been required to impose a new lia-
bility by fashioning an entirely new rule rather than merely to fill
the gaps in existing legislation. Yet the Court declined the opportu-
nity to go substantially beyond what it had hereunto done to protect
federal interests. Thus it appears that the Court is as reluctant to
create new causes of action when uniquely federal interests are at
stake as it is when its lawmaking powers derive from a grant of Con-
gress by way of a statute that contains a comprehensive remedial
scheme. Consequently, there is some support for the proposition that
the Court has imposed limitations on the federal courts' power to
formulate federal common law even when uniquely federal interests
are involved.
Recently, however, the Court exercised its judicial hand (perhaps
so as to preclude its "stiffen[ing] in mortmain"223), by assuming the
role of champion of the national purse. In Boyle v. United Technolo-
gies Corp.,224 the Court once again faced the decision of whether to
221. Id. Thus, the Court stated: "Perhaps no relation between the Government and
a citizen is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of
its armed forces." Id.
222. Id. at 314. The Court further acknowledged that the law in its capacity for
growth "must include the creative work of judges. Soon all law would become antiquated
strait jacket and then dead letter, if that power were lacking." Id. at 313. But it main-
tained that the work of the federal courts, outside the constitutional area "is more mod-
est than that of state courts, particularly in the freedom to create new common-law
liabilities." Id.
223. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947).
224. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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formulate a new rule of law and answered this question in the af-
firmative by creating the government contractor defense. 125 The
Court reasoned that without this defense, contractors would be liable
under state law and that this would impact the government such that
"the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by
the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of
the United States will be directly affected. '226
In reaching this decision, the Court explained that although the
procurement of equipment by the United States constituted a
uniquely federal interest, an additional factor was necessary to sup-
plant state law. That factor was a genuine conflict with state law.227
The conflict, however, "need not be as sharp" as that required for
ordinary preemption when Congress enacts law in a field previously
occupied by state law.22 s "Or to put the point differently, the fact
that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes
what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption
into one that can."2 29 The Court then cited Clearfield for the pro-
position that "where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the
entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is re-
placed by federal rules."23
Given the Court's previous decision in Standard Oil and its pro-
fessed disinclination to fashion law absent a clear statutory prescrip-
tion or a direct conflict that clearly threatens the government's
policies or operation, the dissent's opposing arguments deserve strong
consideration. 231 In view of Standard Oil, Boyle may very well have
225. Id. at 512. Here, a tort law cause of action was brought against the manufac-
turer of a military helicopter that crashed at sea, causing the death of its pilot by drown-
ing. Plaintiffs contended that the helicopter's escape system was defective because,
among other things, the door opened outward instead of inward, which impeded the pi-
lot's ability to escape when the helicopter was submerged. Id. at 502-03.
226. Id. at 507.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 507-08.
230. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
231. The dissent maintained that the Court had overstepped its authority in legis-
lating from the bench. Congress had already considered and rejected "a sustained cam-
paign by Government contractors to legislate for them some defense." Id. at 515
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, they observed that "'[t]here is no federal pre-emption
in vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute to assert it,'" id. at 517 (quot-
ing Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503
(1988)), or without a clear showing that state law does "'major damage,"'" id. at 519
(quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)), to the federal interests. In
the views of the dissent, the issue was, as in Miree, Parnell, and Wallis, collateral to the
government contract, and the litigation itself was between private parties. Id. at 520-21.
been wrongly decided. Perhaps the nature of the rule of law that the
Court fashioned-the establishment of a defense rather than the im-
position of a liability-helps explain the majority's decision. Never-
theless, for the purposes of this Comment, the Court's statements
regarding the kind of conflict necessary to justify the application of
federal common law cast light on our previous finding232 concerning
the different approaches a federal court could take in formulating
federal common law.
The Court's recognition that a uniquely federal interest is neces-
sary but not sufficient to justify the making of law supports the pro-
position that the Court has moved away from the Clearfield/Yazell
route of justifying lawmaking to embrace the conflict path first out-
lined in Wallis. However, while the Court in Wallis required a "sig-
nificant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest"2 33 to
invoke the application of federal law, the Court in Boyle significantly
curtailed the requirement of a significant conflict. Although it insists
that "conflict there must be,"' 234 apparently the need for uniformity
as shown in Clearfield is reason enough to develop preemptive fed-
eral law. Thus, by adhering to the conflict requirement while re-
laxing the criteria of. what makes a conflict significant, the Court
seems to have reconciled the two approaches.
From this it follows that federal courts that interpret Boyle to
mean that a conflict is required for legitimate lawmaking may still
say that the need for uniformity represents a conflict sufficient to
justify formulation of federal rules of decision. But whereas the
Clearfield-Yazell approach sets limits on a court's competence to de-
velop law by requiring a federal source for the rights asserted or at
least a background of relevant federal statutes, the new course frees
the courts from this restriction. It allows the courts to fashion rules,
as did the Court in Boyle, in vacuo or even in the face of some con-
gressional disapproval as long as the court determines that a federal
interest is in jeopardy. Contrary to Standard Oil, Boyle also makes
clear that the protection of the national purse is such an interest and
thus justifies the formulation of federal rules of decision.
In short, the answer to the question of what exactly constitutes a
It "neither touch[es] the rights and duties of the United States,'" id. at 521 (quoting
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956)), nor "has a
'direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury,'" id. at 521 (quoting Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29 (1977)). Moreover, the dissent indicated that even if
the majority was correct in its assessment that the government would be financially bur-
dened since liable contractors would pass on the cost to the government (a deduction that
the dissent found faulty), precedent supported the view that the imposition of costs was
"legally irrelevant." Id. at 527. After all, as Wallis indicated, the Court was not the
guardian of the government's purse.
232. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
233. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
234. Boyle, 487 U.S. 508.
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uniquely federal interest appears to be that any type of federal inter-
est, especially that of safeguarding the national treasury, may qual-
ify as uniquely federal as long as it directly affects the rights and
duties of the United States. But as has been shown, there is another
critical question: whether the interest requires protection because the
underlying federal policy conflicts with state law or because uniform-
ity is necessary to maintain the smooth running of a federal nation-
wide program. In light of Boyle, such a determination renders a
federal court competent to develop and apply federal common law.
C. Application of Supreme Court Precedents to Determine
Whether State Law or Federal Common Law Should Apply
in Actions Charging Former Officers of Federal Savings and
Loan Associations with Breach of Fiduciary Duties
As mentioned earlier, federal courts that have held in favor of
fashioning a federal common law cause of action either for breach of
fiduciary duties or for breach of bylaws base their decisions on the
presence of a uniquely federal interest in the uniform regulation of
federal financial institutions. The courts reached this decision by ex-
amining the objectives of the act under which the institution was
chartered (the HOLA or the FCUA). These examinations revealed
that Congress enacted the HOLA and the FCUA to address the sta-
tus of the nation's financing system and the inadequacy of state law
to deal with the problem. It was Congress's hope that the regulations
promulgated under these statutes would result in uniform and sound
lending practices. The great extent to which these institutions are
regulated, the comprehensive nature of those regulations, and the
plenary authority of the regulatory bodies supported the courts' con-
clusion that uniformity in the regulation of federal financial institu-
tions is, if not of paramount importance, at least a significant
congressional objective.23 5 Thus, there appear to be some grounds for
holding that uniformity in the regulation of federal financial institu-
tions represents a uniquely federal interest.
But as explained above, a uniquely federal interest is not enough
to justify formulating federal common law. As Boyle indicated, a
conflict between a federal policy and state law is required to displace
state law. One is therefore left with the question of whether applica-
tion of state fiduciary law in cases involving the alleged violation of
federal lending regulations would conflict with the pertinent federal
235. See supra notes 17-24, 63-68, and accompanying text.
laws and their underlying policy or interfere with the operation of
federal savings and loan associations as a nationwide federal pro-
gram. This question is further complicated by the fact that one is
dealing with uniformity in two respects: uniformity as a federal ob-
jective of the legislation and uniformity as a possible requirement of
the program for its successful functioning.
As can be seen from the cases discussed in the previous section,
the Court has, from very early on, recognized the importance of uni-
form regulation in the operation of nationwide federal programs, 236
even in respect to legislative acts that are silent on the need for uni-
form implementation. This remains true today as the Court in Boyle
clearly indicated. One would therefore expect that great weight
would be given to the need for uniformity when an act's legislative
history reveals that Congress actually identified uniformity as one of
the act's principal objectives.
Both the HOLA and the FCUA are this type of legislation. Not
only were both acts designed to address a national problem, but their
histories reveal that Congress was actually motivated by the need for
uniformity in the regulation of federal financial institutions. 237 More-
over, unlike the SBA regulations, which according to the Court in
Yazell were replete with admonitions to follow state law, the regula-
tions promulgated under the HOLA make it perfectly clear that the
Board expects federal law, not state law, to apply to matters involv-
ing the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associations. In
May 1983, the Board made this evident when it issued C.F.R. §
545.2, which provided that the regulations are "promulgated pursu-
ant to the plenary and exclusive authority of the Board to regulate
all aspects of the operation of Federal associations . . . This exer-
cise of the Board's authority is preemptive of any state law purport-
ing to address the subject of the operations of Federal
associations."2 " The Supreme Court further supported the Board's
236. Even in the area of commercial paper, which is not regulated by a federal
program, the Court in Clearfield declared that the application of state law was "inappro-
priate" because it would subject the United States to the vagaries of state law. See supra
note 175 and accompanying text. The importance of uniformity was later reaffirmed in
Yazell and Kimbell. Although the Court held against the application of federal common
law in those cases, it did so because the transactions were individually negotiated and
because the regulations of the federal programs themselves called for adherence to state
law. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 17-24, 63-68, and accompanying text. It would, therefore, be
difficult to argue that uniformity was not a primary objective of Congress when it en-
acted the HOLA and the FCUA. It would also be unreasonable to propose that federal
savings and loan associations and federal credit unions do not form part of a national
program in view of the regulatory role that both the Board (now the OTS) and the
NCUA play in the operation of these institutions. See supra note 114.
238. FSLIC v. Kidwell, 716 F. Supp. 1315, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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power to issue such regulations by stating that "Congress plainly en-
visioned that federal savings and loans would be governed by what
the Board-not any particular State-deemed to be the 'best
practices.' ",239
Yet the court in AmeriFirst v. Bomar 4" decided against fashion-
ing federal common law because no significant conflict exists be-
tween state fiduciary law and a federal policy. Apparently, the court
in Bomar failed to consider the legislative purpose of the HOLA and
the policy of uniformity itself as a compelling congressional objec-
tive. But should the court have taken these factors into account?
While an examination of the HOLA reveals that uniformity was one
of its objectives when it was first enacted in 1933, the same cannot
be said of the FIRREA, which amended the HOLA in 1989 to pro-
vide, among other things, a federal cause of action for breach of fi-
duciary duty. The cause of action, however, is available only to the
FDIC. 41 This gives rise to the presumption that Congress intended
state law to apply in actions involving private parties.242 In view of
these developments, the contention that federal law applies to all
matters involving the operation of federal savings and loan associa-
tions is no longer tenable. Just as important, FIRREA suggests that
with respect to actions for breach of fiduciary duties, there is cur-
rently no federal objective in uniform regulation and, consequently,
no significant conflict were state law to apply in these actions.
The Bomar court furthermore maintained that applying state fidu-
ciary law would not interfere with the successful operation of the
federal program nor threaten the federal insurance fund even though
violations of federal regulations would only constitute "some evi-
dence that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the sub-
stantive principles of state law. 2 43 In so holding, the court gave little
consideration to possible impact on the federal savings and loan asso-
ciation program of holding directors and officials of federal institu-
tions liable under a law that would view violations of federal
reguld.tions as a secondary issue. Given that the regulations allegedly
violated in these actions control the lending practices and conduct of
239. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161 (1982).
240. 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See supra notes 79-85 and accompany-
ing text.
241. See supra note 114.
242. Perhaps because with regard to the regulation of financial institutions, state
law can now adequately deal with these problems. Although as mentioned earlier, se&
supra note 65, research is needed to ascertain the adequacy of state law in this area.
243. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. at 1374 (emphasis added).
officers and directors, it would seem that the regulations themselves
form a kind of fiduciary guideline by which the Board, now the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision (OTS), determines the propriety of the ac-
tions of those whom it regulates. Imposing state law that subjects
officers of federal saving and loan associations to other regulations or
principles could lead to great confusion as to which law, federal or
state, determines their legal duties. At worst, the regulation of of-
ficers and directors could be undermined if they were subject to state
laws that afford little significance to the policies underlying the fed-
eral regulations.
Nevertheless, this argument would only hold if the state regula-
tions differed substantively from the federal guidelines. This notwith-
standing, state fiduciary law is unlikely to overlook the violation of
federal regulations. One should also note that the FIRREA's federal
standard of gross negligence is quite high, higher in fact that some
state fiduciary law standards.244 Thus, even if the violation of federal
regulations were treated as a subsidiary question under state law, the
state's lower negligence standard may more than compensate for any
failing on the part of state law to support the federal policies. Fur-
thermore, it seems unlikely that the application of state fiduciary law
in disputes between private parties would lead to confusion regarding
the nature of the duties of officers and directors of federal savings
and loan associations or the applicable regulations in these cases.
The more probable outcome is that officers and directors will realize
that their fiduciary duties are defined by both state and federal law.
Lastly, it is just as unlikely that application of state fiduciary law
would undermine the OTS's attempts to regulate federal financial
institutions in light of the expanded power of enforcement the FIR-
REA provides.2 45
The notion that the federal insurance fund would not be
threatened were state law to apply also weighs heavily against the
formulation of federal common law. Although plaintiff associations
appear to have suffered damage due to the alleged negligent viola-
tion of federal lending practices, they have apparently not suffered
enough damage to seek the assistance of the FDIC and the federal
insurance fund. For this reason, the Court is unlikely to find that a
244. As mentioned, the FIRREA's gross negligence standard does not apply to
private parties, but only to the FDIC. See supra notes 5, 114. Nevertheless, courts that
decide to formulate a federal common law cause of action are likely to look to the stan-
dard that the federal government has imposed on itself in giving shape to the federal
common law standard that is to apply in these actions. From this it follows that private
parties should first ascertain whether state law poses serious problems before requesting
that a federal common law cause of action be established lest they find themselves in a
more difficult position when their request is granted and the standard that is adopted is
that of gross negligence.
245. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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sufficient nexus exists between the violations and the government's
interest, let alone conclude that the federal interest in a healthy in-
surance fund is at risk and in need of the Court's protection. Al-
though uniformity in the regulation of federal savings and loan
associations may be required in some respects, uniformity of law for
breach of fiduciary duties appears unnecessary.
Other reasons make it even more unlikely that the Supreme Court
would formulate federal common law in these cases. Recall that as
private parties, federal savings and loan associations that request the
formulation of a federal common law cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty have no private cause of action under the HOLA-
FIRREA. And as Wallis, Parnell, and Miree demonstrate, the
Court is entirely unwilling to formulate federal common law in favor
of private parties absent a direct impact on the rights and duties of
the United States, which, as has just been shown, is absent here. The
Court could also hold, as it has done so often in the past, that the
federal interests involved are far too speculative and remote to war-
rant the application of federal common law.246 Therefore, rather
than develop federal common law, the Court is more likely to apply
the strict Touche Ross test for implications of private rights of ac-
tions and end the inquiry there.
The answer to the question with which this Part began, namely
whether uniformity in the'regulation of federal savings and loan as-
sociations represents a uniquely federal interest, thus seems clear.
Although one can find in the HOLA's legislative history support for
the proposition that uniformity in the regulation of federal savings
and loan associations is a federal interest, it is not a uniquely federal
interest justifying the fashioning of federal common law. As to
whether there are limitations to the federal courts' lawmaking pow-
ers when uniquely federal interests are involved, the answer also
seems clear. The Court has over the years consistently refused to
create new causes of action or rights in favor of private parties under
federal common law.247 While the Court is willing to fill the gaps in
legislation and to fashion a defense when it deems that the rights
246. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
247. Recall that in Standard Oil the Court denied the federal government's re-
quest that it fashion a new common law liability in the government's favor. The Court in
Standard Oil clearly held that the matter at bar was federal and even acknowledged that
the government's purse would be affected. Yet it held that only Congress had the power
to create new rights and liabilities. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. And in
Boyle the Court fashioned a new defense, not a new liability. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
and duties of the United States or its treasury are in need of protec-
tion, it goes no further. When dealing with uniquely federal inter-
ests, the federal courts' lawmaking power is as limited as when the
power stems from a grant of Congress. In neither instance do the
courts have the authority to create new rights or new liabilities.
D. Application of Supreme Court Precedents to Determine
Whether State or Federal Common Law Should Apply in
Actions Involving Officers of Federal Credit Unions Charged
with Breach of Bylaws
The question presented by the federal credit union cases discussed
previously is similar to the issue involved in the federal savings and
loan association cases, though somewhat more complicated. In the
latter cases, the courts primarily addressed the question of whether
the need for uniformity justifies preempting state fiduciary law with
federal common law. To be sure, the issue of state law preemption
also forms part of the federal credit union problem. But the federal
credit union cases also present another controversial preemption
question: whether the federal legislation in question itself preempts
the application of federal common law. Indeed, in order to determine
whether it can legitimately formulate federal common law, a court
must first conclude that the pertinent legislation does not preclude
the fashioning of federal common law.248 From this it follows that in
the federal credit union cases one must answer not one but two ques-
tions: whether the FCUA preempts federal common law, and if not,
whether federal common law should be applied to create a private
cause of action.
In ruling against the creation of federal common law, the court in
Ridenour v. Andrews Federal Credit Union249 cited the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Illinois II)2G0 for
the proposition that "[f]ederal courts lack authority to impose more
stringent [standards] under federal common law than those imposed
by the [federal] agency charged by Congress with administering the
248. In the federal savings and loan association cases discussed earlier, the com-
prehensive nature of the federal regulations was offered to show that the entire field was
preempted by federal law, but surprisingly the courts gave little consideration to this
issue. The courts probably reasoned that they need not be concerned about whether the
judicial standard would be stricter than the one imposed by the regulatory agency (the
Board, now the OTS) since the agency played a limited role in after the fact suits
brought by private parties. But the same cannot be said of the controversies over demo-
cratic governance in the federal credit union cases since the disputes were ongoing, and
the NCUA had the authority to resolve them. See supra note 114. The NCUA, however,
refused to do so, causing plaintiffs to turn to the courts. Thus, the issue of legislative
preemption arose in these cases as the courts were being asked to act where the agency
had not.
249. 897 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
250. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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comprehensive [regulatory] scheme."2 51 Because the NCUA has
chosen not to become involved in disputes over the democratic gov-
ernance of federal credit unions and has chosen not to give the by-
laws establishing such governance the status of agency regulations,
the court concluded that it lacked authority to establish a federal
common law cause of action.252
Other courts have not been as quick to dismiss plaintiff's cause of
action under federal common law. As noted, the courts in Barany v.
Buller25 and First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander 54 proposed that
"federal common law remedies are not precluded where the statute's
remedies do not afford the aggrieved parties at least a reasonable
alternative to the relief sought. ' 255 The Barany court further con-
cluded that because the relief sought in the present action was not
"co-extensive" with that provided by the FCUA, the preemption rule
articulated in Illinois II did not apply. 6
However, an examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Illi-
nois 11 reveals that the Court based its decision to supplant its previ-
ous ruling in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Illinois 1)257 on the
comprehensive nature of the remedial scheme that the recent amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 258 had insti-
tuted. 59 The Court declared that in enacting the amendments,
Congress intended "to establish an all-encompassing program of
water pollution regulation" 260 and that "[t]he establishment of such
a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which cer-
tainly did not exist when ... [Illinois I] was decided, strongly sug-
gests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that
program with federal common law."' 26 ' The decision to preempt the
federal common law previously established came about not because
251. Ridenour, 897 F.2d at 722 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Illinois II),
451 U.S. at 320).
252. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The Montford court also re-
lied on the FCUA's comprehensive remedial scheme and the regulatory powers given to
the NCUA in holding that Congress intended the NCUA, not the courts, to settle this
kind of dispute. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
253. 670 F. 2d 726 (7th Cir 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 11-27.
254. 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 70-
78.
255. Id. at 1132 (citing Barany, 670 F.2d at 736).
256. Barony, 670 F.2d at 737.
257. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
258. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (Supp. III 1976).
259. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Illinois II), 451 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1972).
260. Id. at 318.
261. Id. at 319.
the relief requested under federal common law was "co-extensive"
with the one provided by the statute, as the Barany court suggested,
but rather because the federal common law standard was more strin-
gent than that imposed by the federal agency responsible for enforc-
ing the statute, 62 as the court in Ridenour indicated. Thus, there is
little support for the Barany court's proposition that federal common
law is not preempted by legislation when the relief requested differs
from that available under a comprehensive federal act.
Furthermore, the rationale the Court used in Illinois 11 to deter-
mine whether the recent amendments preempted federal common
law, namely the comprehensive nature of the act's remedial scheme,
is reminiscent of the approach taken by the Court in Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington6 3 in determining that an implied cause of action
was not available under the SEA. And, as was noted above, the
FCUA's remedial scheme is no less comprehensive than that of the
SEA's, which the Court in Touche Ross ,found to be comprehensive
enough to support the assumption that Congress had provided ex-
actly the remedies it deemed appropriate. 64 This supports the posi-
tion that the comprehensive nature of the FCUA's remedial scheme
precludes the fashioning of additional remedies by the judiciary
under Illinois 11 regardless of whether the judicial remedies are co-
extensive with the ones provided by the statute.
Before concluding that a federal common law cause of action for
breach of bylaws is preempted by the FCUA's remedial scheme,
however, one must also consider that it might be inappropriate to
speak of legislation preempting federal common law where no fed-
eral common law has yet to be established in the area. In Illinois II,
the Court faced the decision of what to do with its previous ruling
that the federal common law of nuisance applied in matters involv-
ing interstate pollution, given that Congress had thereafter acted to
strengthen the statutory law and had provided for its rigorous en-
forcement. 6 5 But no such backward-looking decision was called for
in Barany since the decision to apply federal common law to the
issue before it was one of first impression. The relevance of the Illi-
nois 11 ruling to the federal credit union issue is therefore question-
able, at least in those jurisdictions that have not established federal
common law in this area.
Additionally, were the FCUA's remedial scheme to preempt the
formulation of federal common law, the possibility of obtaining any
relief at all would be seriously jeopardized. Whereas plaintiffs in the
federal savings and loan association cases have recourse to state law
262. Id. at 320.
263. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
264. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
265. Illinois II, 451 U.S. at 307-08.
[VOL. 29: 743. 1992] Federal Common Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
when their claim for the application of federal common law is de-
nied, the same might not hold for those federal credit union plaintiffs
who allege unlawful removal from office. As the court in Rosenberg
v. AT&T Employees Federal Credit Union2 66 indicated, state law
may provide no relief. The plaintiffs also have no administrative
remedies to exhaust as the NCUA is unwilling to hear their com-
plaints. While the court in Montford v. Robins Federal Credit
Union2 17 may be correct in pointing out that the NCUA is the
proper forum in which to submit such complaints, and indeed the
only forum that may provide uniform decisions, the NCUA's refusal
to resolve such complaints cancels this alternative. 8
One should also consider that the NCUA has not explained to the
courts why it refuses to handle controversies involving the demo-
cratic governance of federal credit unions. It is possible that the
agency refuses to become involved not because it feels the issue is
unimportant, but because of other factors, such as insufficient re-
sources to investigate and resolve these disputes. In light of this, the
rationale presented by the Ridenour court supporting its decision not
to adjudicate disputes over the democratic governance of federal
credit unions simply because the NCUA is unwilling to do so seems
misguided.
The ruling in Illinois II, moreover, does not dictate this result. To
be sure, the Court declared that federal courts cannot impose more
rigid standards than those imposed by the agency. But in the federal
credit union cases, the court would not be imposing a stricter stan-
dard than the agency since the NCUA imposes no standard at all.
Further, the issue presented by the federal credit union cases is dif-
ferent from the one involved in Illinois II. In Illinois 11 the agency
acted to enforce the provisions of the statute while plaintiffs pursued
a cause of action under federal common law.269 On the other hand,
in the federal credit union cases, the agency refused to act, and
plaintiffs had no express statutory recourse. For these reasons, statu-
tory law should not preempt federal common law, at least with re-
spect to issues involving the democratic governance of federal credit
unions.
Still this is not to say that federal courts have the authority to
266. 726 F. Supp 573 (D.N.J. 1989). See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying
text.
267. 691 F. Supp. 347 (M.D. Ga. 1988). See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying
text.
268. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
269. Illinois II, 451 U.S. at 310-12.
fashion federal common law in this area. The arguments in favor of
applying federal common law in the federal credit union cases suffer
from the same problems as the arguments presented in favor of ap-
plying federal common law in the federal savings and loan associa-
tion cases. While the FCUA's legislative history calls for the
uniform regulation of federal credit unions, this, by itself, falls short
of the requirements for formulating federal common law because (1)
it appears that the democratic governance of federal credit unions is
not essential for the operation and maintenance of these institutions
as a nationwide federal program (or the NCUA would certainly be
involved), and (2) the failure to apply federal common law would
not infringe the rights and duties of the United States nor threaten
the national treasury.
Further, Congress appears to be either satisfied with the present
level of uniform regulation of federal financial institutions or less
concerned with uniform regulation altogether. The fact that it
amended the FCUA to create a new private right of action for
whistleblowers170 but failed to provide one for federal credit union
employees who are unlawfully dismissed indicates that, at least in
this respect, Congress is content with the current scope of the
FCUA's enforcement scheme.
Lastly, even if uniform regulation were to constitute a uniquely
federal interest, the courts still lack the power under federal common
law to fashion a new private cause of action. As noted earlier, the
comprehensiveness of the FCUA's remedial scheme raises the pre-
sumption that Congress provided exactly those remedies it deemed
appropriate. 17 ' And as has been shown, the Court is just as unwilling
to create new causes of action by means of federal common law as it
is to imply them from a statute. Thus, even though plaintiffs may
not have a remedy under state law, the federal courts are powerless
to help them. This state of affairs provides a strong argument in
favor of 'allowing the federal courts to resume their traditional role
of fashioning remedies for wrongs. 2
V. CONCLUSION
In view of these findings, one may ask why courts such as Barany,
Rosenberg, First Hawaiian Bank, and Kidwell fashioned a federal
common law right of action notwithstanding their conclusion that
270. See supra note 116.
271. See supra part III.C.
272. See Justice Stevens's dissent in Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 24 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted), in which he writes: "Although the federal courts do not
possess the full common-law power of their state counterparts . . . the cases cited ...
nonetheless indicate that the fashioning of remedies for wrongs has traditionally been a
part of the business of the federal courts."
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none could be implied under the strict Touche Ross standard. The
different treatment the two standards ,accord to the policies and
objectives of federal statutes may provide an answer. While Touche
Ross made it clear that a federal statute's objectives and policies
would no longer support the implication of a new right, none of the
federal common law cases examined earlier addressed this issue di-
rectly. Moreover, as the Court stated in both Texas Industries and
Boyle, federal courts do have the authority to fashion law when state
law conflicts with a federal statute's policy or objective or when uni-
formity is necessary to protect the rights and duties of the United
States.
Thus, one cannot fault courts, such as Barany and Rosenberg,
which, in their eagerness to provide relief, resort to examining the
statute's legislative histories for policies or objectives that would be
frustrated were state law to apply. From this perspective, the federal
courts' misunderstanding of their powers to fashion law results from
the Supreme Court's failure to define the few federal objectives that
constitute uniquely federal interests when the rights and duties of
the United States are involved or to articulate clearly the prohibition
against creating new rights of action by means of federal common
law.
This Comment has highlighted the important role that compre-
hensive remedial schemes play in deciding whether a right of action
can be implied from a federal statute or created under federal com-
mon law in either instance where the courts have authority to make
law (that is, when the power derives from a grant of Congress or is
founded on the presence of a uniquely federal interest). It has also
shown the significance of comprehensive remedial schemes in deter-
mining whether federal common law is preempted by legislation in
the field. In situations where any of the above factors presents the
possibility of lawmaking, the Court has established that comprehen-
sive remedial schemes nullify the federal courts' already attenuated
power to formulate law.
This Comment has also delineated the conditions under which fed-
eral courts can fashion federal common law. To recapitulate, federal
courts can fashion law when they find that a uniquely federal inter-
est is in need of protection because application of state law would
(1) infringe the rights and duties of the United States, particularly
by hampering the operation of a nationwide federal program or (2)
threaten the national treasury. But the courts cannot fashion federal
common law when the issue does not affect the federal government
or calls for the creation of a new cause of action or right. In short, as
the Court noted in Texas Industries, the instances in which federal
courts can engage in lawmaking are rather narrow, but it appears
that until the Supreme Court clearly establishes these limits, the
lower courts may continue to formulate federal common law without
legitimate authority.
For these reasons, this Comment urges the Court to address the
.role of federal objectives in the fashioning of federal common law as
thoroughly as it addressed their role in the implication of rights of
action in Touche Ross. However, this Comment also urges the Court
to reconsider whether the comprehensiveness of remedial schemes
should play such a key role in delimiting the courts' lawmaking pow-
ers when the rights and duties of the United States stem from a
congressional act. Considering that Congress in all its wisdom cannot
foresee all the various problems and injuries that could arise from
even a narrowly worded act, there is strong support for the proposi-
tion that courts should be allowed not only to fill the interstices of
acts, but also to create rights of action when such rights are required
to fulfill the acts' objectives. This power would ensure that valuable
federal rights, such as participation in the democratic governance of
federal credit unions, are protected despite funding deficits or other
contingencies that prevent the appropriate federal agency from
resolving conflicts among private parties regarding those rights. It
would also ensure that substantial wrongs are not left without re-
dress simply because state law has either been preempted or provides
no remedy and the pertinent federal act overlooked the possibility of
controversies among private parties and is therefore silent on the
matter of private rights of action.
This Comment also urges the Court to consider whether it is ap-
propriate for federal courts, as impartial adjudicators of the disputes
before them, to create law, as the Court did in Boyle, in favor of one
party for the sake of another party when that other party is the
United States. Indeed, the proposition that federal courts have the
authority to fashion law absent a federal act, but only for the benefit
of the Unites States, seems inconsistent with the doctrine of the sep-
aration of powers and the Court's own statements regarding the lim-
ited lawmaking powers of federal courts. If courts do not have the
authority to fill in any hiatus Congress left in the area because law-
making is Congress's prerogative and the courts should not upset the
delicate balance of comprehensive remedial schemes, then whence
comes the courts' authority to fashion federal law and displace state
law when there is no pertinent federal statute at all? Moreover, the
fact that the federal treasury or the rights and duties of the United
States would be adversely affected absent such law should not alter
the result. As the Court itself has emphasized, the federal courts are
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in the business of enforcing the law, not setting federal policy. Con-
gress and the Executive Branch are the legitimate watchdogs273 of
the national purse, not the federal courts.
It would therefore seem, contrary to the decision reached in Boyle,
that if the federal courts have any authority to fashion law when the
rights and duties of the United States are implicated, it should be
pursuant to federal acts and be irrespective of the nature of the par-
ties involved. The former limitation would ensure that courts that
fashion law are guided and limited by the act's objectives. The latter
limitation would ensure that the federal rights of private parties are
fully vindicated and that the United States and affiliated parties
would receive no special privilege by way of federal common law
that is not authorized and sanctioned by Congress. The need for uni-
form law to protect nationwide federal programs would still provide
the courts with the authority to engage in interstitial lawmaking.
The courts would also continue to have authority to fashion federal
common law in the absence of legislation when the conflict involves
other types of uniquely federal interests, such as interstate and inter-
national disputes and admiralty cases.
RAQUEL MARIA PRIEGUEZ
273. They may not be Dobermans but the back yard is theirs to guard.

